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Abstract 
 
 
A COMPARISON OF QUALITY INDICATORS BETWEEN MEDICARE ACCOUNTABLE 
CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS USING 
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATA 
 
By W. Wesley Campbell, III, PhD 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Health Related Sciences at Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2018 
Major Director: Carolyn Watts, PhD, Chair, Department of Health Administration 
The purpose of this study is to explore differences in quality between Medicare 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO).  Three 
outcomes measures reported by these plans use different methodologies but possess enough 
alignment to permit comparison:  percent of diabetic patients with last HbA1c > 9.0%, colon 
cancer screening rate and ER visits per 1,000.  These outcomes are the dependent variables (DV).  
A secondary purpose is to explore differences in quality based on the size of the beneficiary 
population served, using the same measures. 
As the Medicare program faces threats to its solvency in coming decades, with 10,000 baby 
boomers becoming eligible every day, and the ongoing national conversation about healthcare 
more generally, approaches to Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) are becoming more common.  
Organizations seeking to identify the types of VBP arrangements in which they should enter have 
precious little information on the comparative performance of VBP approaches relative to 
  
 
outcomes measures.  Different structures create different incentives through the plan design and 
risk/reward.  The convergence or dissipation of the plan incentives at the level of the provider, 
particularly in primary care, may be a source of variance. 
This study is retrospective, non-experimental, and uses publicly available data on the 
performance of Medicare ACO and HMO plans in calendar year 2015, for the identified measures.  
Using the Donabedian Structure-Process-Outcome framework, this study explores the impact of 
structure by type of plan and size of population served, relative to the outcomes.  Race, average 
Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score and duration of operations are control variables.  
The analysis uses multiple hierarchical regression to better understand the relationship between the 
independent variables (IV) and DVs, after the impact of the control variables (CV). 
After controls, the IVs did offer some explanation of variation in outcomes.  The ACO 
plans fared better on HbA1c control, while HMO plans had fewer ER visits per 1,000.  No 
discernable difference existed between the HMO and ACO plans with regard to colon cancer 
screening rate.  Serving larger populations led to better performance on all three measures.  In 
general performance was worse on each measure in both models when the percent of not-White 
patients or average HCC risk score increased.  A longer duration of operations also associated to 
better performance on the outcome measures. 
Keywords:  Accountable care organization, health maintenance organization, HEDIS, NQF, 
quality, SPO 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of structure relative to outcome using the 
Donabedian quality framework.  The focus is on Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs) and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).  The outcomes of interest describe 
clinical, prevention and utilization measures based on the percent of population in each model 
meeting certain criteria.  Because no existing similar studies appear to exist, this effort is timely 
and relevant to the “big” questions concerning quality and coverage ongoing in the national 
debate about healthcare reform.   
Background 
Questions about approaches to healthcare coverage, quality and ever increasing costs are 
not new.  Theodore Roosevelt included a campaign plank for national healthcare in his “Bull 
Moose” Presidential run in 1912 (Hoffman, 2008).  In the World War II era, the organized labor 
movement began to make inroads into employer-sponsored insurance through collective 
bargaining negotiations (Hoffman, 2008).  In 1965, the Medicare program came into existence to 
contend with coverage and cost, based on policy discussions beginning in the Truman 
administration.  As the US national healthcare expenditure (NHE) reaches 17% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), Medicare a/k/a the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
consumes 20% of the NHE (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, August, 
2016). 
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Speculation about insolvency of the Medicare Trust Fund projects funding through 
perhaps 2030 (Dickson, 2016).  CMS in more recent years began to develop novel approaches to 
confronting increasing costs first through the implementation of the Inpatient Prospect Payment 
System (1982), commonly known as “DRGs” and later through the Resource-Based Relative 
Value Scale methodology and development of the Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS) for Part B 
services (1992).  As managed care became de rigueur, particularly in the 1980s, CMS developed 
Part C, Medicare Managed Care or what we know today as “Medicare Advantage” as an 
alternative to fee-for-service.  In 2010, through the passage of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), CMS began to create innovative approaches by altering 
incentives for providers, particularly in primary care (PPACA, 2010).  One of these new 
approaches is the Accountable Care Organization (ACO). 
Medicare managed care plans and ACOs enhance the focus on primary care services, 
directly and indirectly, using different tools and financial relationships (Blackstone & Fuhr, 
2016; Bolch, 2013).  These relationships are, at some level, simply variations on a theme with 
strong resemblance to Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) arrangements, which continue to 
proliferate in commercial and government insurance offerings (Rappleye, 2015).  Similarities 
between Medicare Advantage and ACOs exist, congruent with VBP, through a focus on quality 
and cost. 
Despite the similarities in approaches, significant differences also exist between Medicare 
Advantage and ACOs.  Viewed from the perspective of structure in the Donabedian “Structure-
Process-Outcome” (SPO) framework, understanding these differences may better serve robust 
evaluation of the quality in these programs (A. Donabedian, 1966).  This is particularly relevant 
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when it comes to Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in Medicare Advantage as they 
comprise 64% of the total available plans nationwide (Kaiser Family Foundation, May, 2016). 
No published works exist documenting the differences in the structure of these programs 
relative to the SPO framework.  Contrasting these programs through the evaluation of results 
increases the existing knowledge of their applicability and success in contending with increasing 
cost and the lack of apparent improvement in ambulatory quality of care (Levine, Linder, & 
Landon, 2016).  The approach outlined herein appears to be novel and is an early step towards 
filling the literature gap regarding performance of these important programs.    
The following describes the programmatic approaches and history of the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACO and HMO programs in Medicare.  The conceptual 
framework discussion will integrate the SPO through two perspectives permitting a comparison 
of outcomes between ACOs and HMOs and by size of the beneficiary population served. 
Medicare Shared Savings Program ACOs 
CMS created the MSSP through PPACA in response to long-standing and increasing 
concerns over quality, cost and access.  The ACO is a group of providers who voluntarily 
collaborate to deliver high quality, coordinated care to Medicare beneficiaries.  These providers 
can include physicians, hospitals and other providers, e.g., long-term care, skilled nursing, DME, 
therapists (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 2015a). 
Three “tracks” exist in the MSSP, each with differences in upside financial benefit and 
downside financial risk.  All ACOs must meet certain quality benchmarks to access upside 
benefit.  The level of performance relative to quality benchmarks determines the portion of the 
maximum “shared savings” available.  ACOs must exceed a savings threshold to qualify for 
shared savings.  Shared savings is the difference between medical expense budget for a 
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population of beneficiaries, based on historical benchmarks, and actual expenses.  Table 1 
highlights differences in risk/shared savings between the tracks: 
Table 1: MSSP Share Savings and Risk by Track 
 Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 
Shared savings + + + 
Shared risk - + + 
Shared savings cap 50% 60% 70% 
Risk sharing cap N/A 5% 7.5% 
 
In track 1, actual shared savings may not exceed 10% of the ACO’s updated medical 
expense benchmark.  In tracks 2 and 3, actual shared savings may not exceed 15% and 20%, 
respectively, of the medical expense benchmark.  Track 2 and 3 ACOs have the option to specify 
symmetrical medical savings rates (MSR) and medical loss rates (MLR), between 0% and 2% 
in .5% increments.  Starting in calendar year 2017, a track 1+ option exists as an “Advanced 
Alternative Payment Model” (APM) for purposes of the Medicare Incentive Payment System 
(MIPS).   
Calendar year 2015, was the third “performance year” for the MSSP ACOs, although not 
all operated for all three years. The vast majority of ACOs are non-risk bearing.  Table 2 shows 
the number of ACOs by year, and distribution by track for 2015. 
Table 2:  Count of MSSP ACOs 
Year Count of MSSP ACOs 
2012 114 
2013 220 
2014 333 
2015 439 
Track 1 401 
Track 2 3 
Track 3 35 
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CMS publishes publicly available performance data on all MSSP ACOs.  Table 3 
provides data on savings for the first three performance years, including all ACO tracks, reported 
by CMS. 
Table 3:  MSSP ACO Shared Savings 2013-2015 
 2013 2014 2015 
Total savings $705M $806M $429M 
Total shared savings $315M $341M Not reported 
ACOs earning shared savings 89 92 119 
ACOs generating savings with no sharing 60 89 83 
 
The “Not Reported” amount of total shared savings in 2015, performance year 3, was 
perhaps intentional on the part of CMS.  Analysis of the performance data indicates 189 ACOs 
overspent their budgets by a total of $1,138,967,553.  Another 203 ACOs generated savings of 
$1,568,222,249.  The difference is the $429M total savings reported by CMS.  However, 
summing the shared savings amount reported in the performance data shows $645,543,866 
returned to a subset of the 202 ACOs (119) generating savings.  This means CMS returned more 
dollars in shared savings than the total MSSP ACO savings – over $200M more.  In other words, 
the MSSP program increased total costs by more than $200M in 2015 (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 2014; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 
2015b; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 2016b). 
Most ACOS in 2015, and earlier, exist through Independent Practice Associations (IPA) 
or group practices and nearly one-half include an acute care hospital (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 2017b).  Nearly two thirds of these ACOs, 62%, operated in 
population dense metropolitan areas with just over 6M beneficiaries attributed to ACOs with 
HSS headquarters in:  Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta and Chicago (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 2017b).  Overlaying maps of ACO locations with 
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physicians per population density and higher per capita beneficiary expense reveals what appears 
to be a high degree of correlation between the highest cost areas, more physicians per capita and 
presence of ACOs.   
Medicare Advantage 
Medicare managed care began in the 1980s, became “Part C” in the 1990s and was 
renamed “Medicare Advantage” in 2003 as Medicare began to more actively push the program.  
In 1992, total enrollment was 6.9M.  Enrollment in 2016 was 17.6M and is projected to increase 
to 22M by 2020 (Neuman & Jacobsen, 2014).  Plans offered through delivery systems, called 
“Provider-Sponsored Organizations” (PSO) are increasing in number, but in 2016 insurance-
based plans accounted for 70% of all plans nationally.  In fact, companies like:  Anthem, 
UnitedHealthcare, Cigna and Humana offer 21% of all plans (Kaiser Family Foundation, May, 
2016).  The HMO plans are 64% of the total, with UnitedHealthcare and Humana offering 39% 
of them (Jacobsen, Casillas, Damico, Neuman, & Gold, 2016). 
Plans bid contracts to CMS to provide care for a defined population based on geography 
at no smaller than a county level.  The plans take risk from CMS in the form of a per member per 
year (PMPY) capitation and cover all Part A and B services.  Many plans offer Part D benefits as 
well.  ACOs do not offer Part D benefits.  The plans enroll a provider network to provide care, 
and in the case of HMO plans pass risk onto primary care providers (PCP) through a capitation 
rate.  Beneficiaries must have a PCP in HMO plans.  Other plan types offer more flexibility.  
Most provider networks are limited to very narrow, particularly in the HMO plans (Jacobsen, 
Trilling, Neuman, Damico, & Gold, 2016).  Plans have great flexibility to define premiums and 
cost sharing with beneficiaries.   
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Total Medicare Advantage HMO spending was slightly less than Medicare FFS spending 
by $378B, in 2016 (Biles, Casillas, & Guterman, 2016).  In the top 25 counties with the greatest 
difference between Medicare Advantage and Medicare FFS expenses, HMOs underspent 
Medicare FFS by $5.27B.  Everywhere else, the HMO plans overspent Medicare FFS by $1.0B 
while all other Medicare Advantage plans types overspent Medicare FFS by $3.8B (Biles et al., 
2016).  The net savings to Medicare was approximately $427M for the entire Medicare 
Advantage program. 
The list of states with plan offerings covering two thirds of Medicare Advantage enrolled 
beneficiaries includes, in descending order of enrollment:  California, Florida, New York, Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, North Carolina, Minnesota, Georgia, Arizona, Tennessee and 
Wisconsin.  This list certainly shares some geographic overlap with ACOs while covering a 
much larger geographic range including less population dense states. 
Conclusions 
Medicare clearly recognizes the need to develop better approaches to resolving economic 
instability in the program, while improving quality.  The HMO program is older than the ACO 
program, but programmatic intervention by Medicare is not a new phenomenon.  The programs 
share some common attributes while simultaneously possessing significant differences, explored 
more fully in the chapter, “Conceptual Framework.”  The SPO framework is useful to elucidate 
contrasts of structure in assessing the achievement of these programs on quality measures. 
The structural differences between ACOs and HMOs originate with CMS through the 
design of the programs.  The examples of these differences, discussed in the Conceptual 
Framework, are structural responses to the incentives running through these models.  These 
incentives exist in layers first through the organization, then through the provider and lastly to 
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the beneficiaries.  The Conceptual Framework connects the SPO to these programs by examining 
the structural differences which represent points where the incentives may diverge. 
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Chapter 2:  Conceptual Framework 
 
 
Much of the focus in today’s healthcare environment is on outcomes, which some 
consider to be indicative of quality.  Many organizations, including the National Committee on 
Quality Assurance (NCQA) and the National Quality Foundation (NQF), promulgate quality 
measurements.  Measurements could be end-point oriented, e.g., blood sugar control in a diabetic 
population.  Measurements could also be cost or utilization oriented, e.g., ER utilization.  Other 
measures could be process-related activities that represent an end-point or address a gap in care, 
but may not be a direct indicator of current health status, e.g., colon cancer screening.  Value-
based purchasing approaches place a great deal of emphasis on outcome measures.   
“Quality” remains as fungible today as it was when Donabedian attempted to put some 
parameters around its meaning (A. Donabedian, 1966).  Despite the efforts of the Institute of 
Medicine and others to cement a common understanding of quality, various methodologies for 
measurement and evaluation compete for attention often with different levels of measurement or 
foci (Institute of Medicine, 2000).   
From a research perspective, a singular focus on the results of care is inadequate in 
understanding quality.  The Donabedian SPO framework relies on assessing Structure, Process 
and Outcome in evaluating the quality of healthcare services (A. Donabedian, 1966).  Applying 
the SPO framework is a time honored and frequent approach in outcomes research (Ayanian & 
Markel, 2016).  The directional SPO elements provide the closest perspective to a 360◦ view of 
the delivery-side inputs.  In the SPO, structure is foundational as it exists prior to any process 
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and facilitates process.  Outcome results directly from process.  The SPO framework permits 
evaluation of quality as something more than simply an outcome.  This framework enables the 
researcher to not only ascertain whether outcomes may be different but to explore hypotheses as 
to why the differences may exist. 
The lack of agreement between the various organizations developing quality measures is 
in and of itself something of a contradiction to Donabedian’s approach – something he might 
characterize as the absence of a “firm foundation of prior agreement” before attempting to assess 
quality (A. Donabedian, 1988).  On balance, however, while specifics of individual measures 
may differ based on methodology some agreement exists between the various schemes as to the 
types of measures.  Most include some health status measurements, HbA1c level or blood 
pressure, for example.  Most include process measures geared towards prevention or early 
detection, like colon or breast cancer screening.  Measures also exist to gauge the 
appropriateness of services, e.g., antibiotic use in upper respiratory infections or otitis media.  
Utilization measures are common as well, for example, ER visits per 1,000 population.  So, 
while firm foundations may not exist regarding the specifics of measurements, like in the case of 
HbA1c level applicability to Type I or Type II diabetics, the idea that blood sugar control is 
important in a diabetic population supports the measurement methodology.  
Structure 
Donabedian referred to structure in terms of resources from the perspectives of 
allocation, location, funding and organization (A. Donabedian, 1966; R. C. Donabedian A., 
Wheeler, & Wyszewianski, 1982).  In the SPO, structure describes attributes of the care setting 
(A. Donabedian, 1988).  The attributes and resources are human and capital, organizational and 
financing.  The Donabedian framework suggests that improvements in structure would enable 
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process improvements leading to improvements in outcome.  Differences in structure may be 
more easily observed than differences in process, and as a result structure is often an independent 
variable in outcomes research.  The chapter entitled, “Literature Review,” identifies several 
examples of contrasts in outcomes based on differences in structure. 
The size and composition of a provider panel enrolled in a managed care contract or 
employed in an organization would be examples of structure.  In this research, the size of the 
beneficiary population served by an ACO or HMO is an element of structure for three important 
reasons.  First, in order to serve a greater number of beneficiaries, the plan or program would 
need more provider, locations, staff and equipment.  Second, the size of the beneficiary 
population determines total medical expense.  While cost is an outcome relative to the SPO, 
budget is an organizational attribute and as such is an element of structure.  Third, greater mass 
may provide better leverage to optimize the response to incentives.  Risk spread over a larger 
population might be easier to manage.  In this study, the size of the beneficiary population is an 
independent variable and represents differences in structure. 
In today’s environment we could add the quality measurement as a structure variable 
because different systems of measurement exist.  In using structure as a basis for comparison, the 
differences in what quality means relative to each model presents unique challenges in evaluating 
outcomes.  It is for these reason, a differentiation of reporting mechanisms is part of the 
delineation of HMO and ACO attributes that follows.   
The following section discusses several key structure differences between HMOs and 
ACOs.  On balance, the incentives through the ACO program are more diffuse than incentives 
existing in the HMO program.  This is in no small part because HMO plans, providers and 
patients share some portion of the same financial risk.  In the delineation of structure differences 
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these incentives become apparent through approaches to enrollment, provide participation, and 
payment/reporting.   
Differences in Structure Between Medicare HMOs and ACOs 
With a good understanding of HMO and ACO programs from the Introduction, further 
delineation of structure differences is possible.  The following is not the complete menu of 
differences, but in terms of the SPO framework serves as the basis of quality comparison relative 
to the structure of these programs.  If over time more ACOs move to risk-bearing models as 
CMS certainly desires, these differences may or may not remain significant.  It is important to 
note, also, that while differences between Medicare Advantage and FFS are well chronicled, the 
recent implementation of MIPS may obscure future differences. 
Difference:  beneficiary enrollment versus attribution.  Beneficiary enrollment in 
Medicare Advantage is active and voluntary.  The beneficiary must choose to enroll.  Premium 
payments go to the plan, not Medicare.  In ACOs, beneficiaries become attributed based on 
where they receive the “preponderance of care” if their provider affiliates with an ACO.  This 
attribution occurs at the end of a performance period as opposed to Medicare Advantage 
enrollment, which occurs during open enrollment.   
When a beneficiary in an HMO plan presents for primary care with a network provider, 
the beneficiary has a plan ID card.  When a beneficiary presents for primary care to an ACO 
provider, the beneficiary has a Part B card with no identification as to attribution status.  The 
practical implications of this are that the HMO providers know when an HMO subscriber is 
receiving care at the time of care but the ACO providers will not know if that beneficiary will 
become attributed until the end of the calendar year.  Beneficiaries enrolled in a Medicare 
Advantage plan cannot be attributed to an ACO.   
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Difference:  provider participation in HMOs versus ACOs.  A provider may only 
participate with one ACO.  In Medicare Advantage, depending on the plan’s network, providers 
could contract with and receive capitation from multiple HMOs.  ACO beneficiaries can see any 
Part B participating provider.  HMO subscribers must use in-network providers.  An ACO 
beneficiary could receive primary care services from different providers in different 
organizations or systems during the course of a year.  An HMO beneficiary must choose a PCP 
from the list of in-network providers.  In order to see a different PCP, the beneficiary must notify 
the HMO of their desire to change.   
ACO beneficiaries could see an ACO PCP while getting specialty care from providers not 
part of that ACO, or even in a different ACO.  HMO beneficiaries can obtain specialty care from 
in-network providers, usually only with a referral authorized by the PCP.  The provider 
“network” available to the ACO beneficiary is any Part B participating provider.  The same is 
true of acute care providers.  The HMO provider network is much more limited, including which 
hospitals the beneficiary could use.  Of course, there are exceptions for emergencies and travel, 
etc.  The Medicare Advantage Preferred Provider (PPO) networks are typically more open than 
HMO networks, but still not as open to beneficiaries as ACOs.   
The practical implications relative to incentives are evident through the “shaping” of the 
provider networks and restrictions on accessing out-of-network providers.  The ACO providers 
have limited ability to restrict beneficiaries from accessing care whenever and wherever they 
wish.  Yet, the ACO is still responsible for the total cost of care and quality for Parts A and B for 
any attributed beneficiary who they do not know will become attributed until after the episodes 
of care.  CMS rules permit Medicare Advantage plans to tell beneficiaries which providers they 
may see for care.  ACOs cannot impose these kinds of restrictions.  
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Difference:  payment and reporting in HMOs Versus ACOs.  In Medicare Advantage, 
the link between payment and reporting is very different from Medicare ACOs.  Generally 
speaking, and specifically for primary care services, reporting in Medicare HMOs does not drive 
payment.  In ACOs, reporting, i.e., billing, does drive payment and it serves a secondary purpose 
regarding quality measurement. 
Payment.  Payment mechanisms for episodes of care are very different in HMOs and 
ACOs.  Any provider rendering services to an ACO attributed beneficiary bills Medicare just as 
they would for any Medicare FFS beneficiary.  This is true whether the provider is a PCP, 
specialist, hospital, diagnostic facility or anything else.  Part B beneficiaries have a 20% cost 
sharing for most services covered under Medicare FFS.  This applies to services provided 
through ACOs, which are by definition Medicare FFS.  Medicare HMOs have the ability to 
change Medicare benefits particularly with respect to beneficiary cost-sharing for covered 
services.  ACO attributed beneficiaries are FFS beneficiaries.  Medicare HMO enrolled 
beneficiaries are not FFS beneficiaries.      
In HMOs the PCPs are almost universally capitated at least for the “bucket” of primary 
care services covered through the plan.  The PCP submits an encounter level report of services 
provided, with numeric codes mapped to the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
(HEDIS) measures promulgated by the NCQA, not for payment but rather for reporting.  These 
PCPs also transmit information to the HMO plans to identify services rendered allowing the 
plans to adjudicate beneficiary cost-sharing.  An in-network HMO specialist might take 
capitation for certain patients or programs, e.g., Special Needs Programs, but for many of these 
beneficiaries will submit a claim for payment to the HMO.  The payment is then based on the 
HMO’s fee schedule that the provider agrees to as part of their network participation contract.  
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The HMO fee schedule could be the same as the MFS or it could be different and the HMO 
beneficiary could have the same or different cost-sharing.  The Medicare Advantage plans have 
the ability to alter Medicare benefits, particularly beneficiary cost-sharing.  ACOs do not have 
this ability. 
Reporting.  Primary care providers in HMOs report the same Current Procedural 
Terminology (CPT) identifying services as any other Part B provider.  The difference is how 
these codes determine payment, as discussed above.   The PCPs also report additional data at the 
encounter level using “Category II” CPT codes.  These are the numeric codes mapping to the 
HEDIS measures.  For instance, if during a PCP encounter the HMO beneficiary has a blood 
pressure of 140/90, the PCP would report codes 3077F for most recent systolic pressure ≥140, 
and code 3080F for most recent diastolic pressure ≥90.  If the visit was for routine follow-up, the 
PCP would also report an Evaluation and Management CPT code to identify the service.  Correct 
and complete diagnosis coding is essential in Medicare Advantage, sometimes for payment 
purposes but more to identify patient risk and as a result HMO providers typically report every 
applicable diagnosis on at least an annual basis.  Diagnosis codes and other factors map into 
Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk scores (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS), HHS, 2016a).  These risk scores determine the capitation rate plans get from Medicare.  
They also influence capitation rates PCPs receive from HMO plans. 
Encounter level reporting in ACOs functions primarily for payment.  It is no different 
from claims non-ACO providers submit for services.  While Medicare encourages any part B 
provider to report Category II codes it is entirely optional outside Medicare Advantage.  Other 
mechanisms for reporting also exist, e.g., Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), which 
are retrospective in nature, typically.  In fact, it is through mechanisms like PQRS that ACOs 
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sometimes report quality data to Medicare.  In general, however, Medicare directs the ACO to 
sample assigned beneficiaries and extract data from the medical record on a patient-by-patient 
basis for ACO-specific quality measures (RTI International, 2015).   
Similarities Between Medicare HMOs and Medicare ACOs 
Despite all the areas of differentiation outlined above, one element of striking similarity 
exists between Medicare HMOs and ACOs.  Namely, when it comes to financial performance the 
more beneficiaries in the pool, the better. 
Figure 1 indicates in calendar year 2015, and preceding years, the ACO minimum savings 
rate, i.e., the threshold, decreases as the number of beneficiaries increases. 
 
Figure 1:  ACO Beneficiaries and MSR 
 
The greater the number of attributed beneficiaries, and correspondingly the larger the 
total benchmark expenditures, the lower the percentage savings threshold to earn shared savings.  
An ACO with 10,000 attributed beneficiaries would have to nearly double the savings rate 
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(3.9%) of an ACO with 60,000 beneficiaries (2.0%) to earn shared savings.  If the benchmark per 
capita expense is $10,000, the larger ACO would need to exceed $12M in savings to earn a share 
at a 2.0% MSR.  The smaller ACO would have to exceed $3.9M in savings to earn a share at a 
3.9% MSR.  In this example on total benchmark expenses of $600M and $100M, this structure 
clearly poses a challenge to smaller ACOs.  ACOs with 10,000 beneficiaries, 17% of the larger 
ACO with 60,000, have a dollar savings threshold of 33% of the larger ACO’s.  Larger ACOs 
need to reduce per capita expenses by less than smaller ACOs to earn shared savings.   
In Medicare HMOs, the PMPY received from Medicare would exhibit the same tendency.  
Larger HMOs, will take in more revenue but need to save a smaller percentage per capita on a 
greater number of enrollees to benefit economically from its risk-taking.  This applies as well to 
the PCPs taking risk from the HMOs in terms of the number of patients in their panels.  The 
HCC risk scores impact this and existing evidence indicates Medicare Advantage plans with 
more enrollees falling into HCCs with greater margin potential generate more profit (Newhouse 
et al., 2013). 
Regarding the research questions based on the size of the beneficiary population as a 
difference in structure, this incentive to create mass is important.  If mass creates financial 
incentives for the HMO or ACO, or HMO PCP, does it similarly enable achievement on quality 
measures? 
Process 
The SPO describes process essentially as “what” in terms of activities or inputs to care.  
Where structure refers to attributes, process is the application of those attributes at the level of 
the patient (A. Donabedian, 1988).  Process incorporates both the technical and interpersonal 
skills evident in a system of care (A. Donabedian, 1966).  It might describe history taking, 
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accurate diagnosis, appropriate follow-up, or the openness of the communication in the provider-
patient relationship.  Process is also often an independent variable in outcomes research 
frequently in conjunction with structure. 
Process can also describe patient involvement (A. Donabedian, 1988).  While it is not a 
patient-centric perspective, like the Anderson Behavioral Model of Health Services Utilization, it 
does incorporate elements of patient activation or care seeking (Andersen, 1995; A. Donabedian, 
1988).  Differentiating structure and process can be difficult as the boundaries are not always 
evident.  The existence of a diabetes self-management program with diabetic educators and 
nutritionists would be a structural attribute, for example.  At the same time, patient participation 
in a diabetes self-management program, recommendations made and adherence to them would 
fall under process.  
Another example of the often confusing boundary between structure and process would 
be the need for PCP referral to access specialty care in an HMO.  The existence of this 
requirement relates to payment and is therefore an element of structure.  However, the 
determination of the need for specialty referral relates directly to technical process in the system 
of care. 
The purpose of this study is not to assess the impact of variation in process on outcome.  
At the same time, process is not completely divorced from structure.  All thing being equal, 
differences in the technical or interpersonal processes relative to the SPO should exhibit no more 
variation in Medicare HMOs than they do in ACOs.  Board eligibility or certification would be a 
prerequisite to participation in either and ACO or HMO, for instance, in the vast majority of 
cases.  The US Preventive Task Force (USPTF) recommendations for diabetic self-care, 
frequency of HbA1c testing and screening for nephropathy or retinopathy, are often the basis for 
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treatment plans used by PCPs nationally.  In fact, PPACA mandated coverage of USPTF 
recommendations with A and B evidence ratings with no patient cost-sharing (Shuval et al., 
2017).  The same is true for recommendations regarding cancer screening or other prevention-
oriented services.  Despite the difference in measurement methodology in some cases between 
HEDIS and NQF, the congruence in the domains of measurement supports the assumption that 
variation in technical process would not be significantly different between HMOs and ACOs. 
This is not to say differences in process do not exist in these programs.  Rather an 
assumption is being made that process variation exists in both programs to the same degree.  In 
other words, differences in the “quality” of care provided through these programs may be 
attributable to structure more so than process (Muhlestein, Croshaw, Merrill, Pena, & James, 
2013).  This is in no small part because the different structures create different incentives for the 
participating organizations or providers.  While the creation of these incentives based on 
structure is out of scope for this research, the nature of these incentives deserves some 
discussion.  Since the incentives are mostly economic in nature, and relate to the cost of care or 
capitation rate at the ACO or HMO level, an obvious approach would be to focus on reducing 
unnecessary use of higher cost services in the ER or acute care setting. 
ACO incentives.  A larger ACO needs to save a lesser percentage of medical expense to 
generate shared savings than a smaller ACO.  One-half of the MSSP ACOs include a hospital.  
Because ACO beneficiaries are FFS beneficiaries, they are not obligated to use either ACO 
providers or the ACO hospital.  And, because these beneficiaries are FFS beneficiaries, provider 
revenue is dependent on providing a service.  In the ACO model, reducing ER or acute care 
utilization at the ACO hospital means a reduction in revenue.  Since much of the operating cost 
of these hospitals is fixed or has fixed-cost attributes, reducing this utilization may well mean a 
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reduction in operating income.  If the ACO is able to exceed its savings threshold, the return then 
is up to 50% of that savings, in the MSSP Track 1 and that amount may not exceed 10% of the 
total benchmark medical expense.   
The ACO has an incentive to reduce costs.  It may benefit from cost savings if it meets 
the ACO quality measures.  The ACO may share none, some or all of the cost savings with the 
providers.  The providers continue to receive FFS payments.  In order to reduce cost these 
providers might focus on utilization.  This may mean the providers receive less FFS payment.  If 
there are 1,000 providers, each might share 1/1,000 of the 50% of the total earned shared 
savings.  This amount would quite likely be less than the FFS revenues generated had those 
patients been seen.  The beneficiary has no real incentive to use ACO providers, at least so far as 
the program incentives exist.  Since the beneficiary can see any Part B participating provider, and 
has the same co-insurance responsibility, the decision about from whom to obtain services may 
not be economic. 
HMO incentives.  The HMO takes risk from Medicare.  Said differently, the HMO gets 
paid in advance for care, based on actuarial projections using the HCC risk score and other 
factors.  Reducing utilization for the HMO provides a direct economic benefit to the HMO.  
Because the HMO shares financial risk with providers, particularly primary care providers, the 
incentive to reduce utilization also exists at the provider level.  Quality measures are important in 
these HMOs as attainment at higher levels results in higher Star Ratings and potentially 
additional financial benefit.  Beneficiaries have restrictions about which providers they may see.  
Going outside the provider network may increase beneficiary cost sharing.  Because the HMO 
can modify benefits, common services like presenting in the ER may increase beneficiary cost 
sharing if the visit is not pre-authorized by the PCP. 
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At the ACO or HMO organization level, the different bottom-line impacts related to FFS 
payment versus pre-payment via capitation and risk, means a reduction in ER or acute care 
services creates different financial implications.  Digging deeper to focus on the PCP incentives 
relative to this focus on utilization reveals again disparity. 
Viewing structure through study variables.  The outcome measures of this study 
related to blood sugar control, colon cancer screening and ER utilization are representative of 
three important primary care functions:  chronic disease management, prevention, and utilization 
management.  Understanding why these activities matter, and how the incentives through the 
ACO and HMO may be different for each, is important to putting structure in the right context.   
Diabetes management.  Diabetes management almost universally involves management 
of blood sugar, frequently measured by the glycosylated hemoglobin, or HbA1c, which measures 
average blood sugar concentration over a three months period.  Diabetes is a dangerous disease 
because the excess blood sugar damages blood vessels and nerves over time leading to 
macrovascular and microvascular complications.  One of the most concerning microvascular 
complications is the onset of chronic kidney disease.  Diabetes, particularly Type II, 
disproportionately affects certain populations.  Race/ethnicity and age are risk factors for 
diabetes and chronic kidney disease as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4:  Prevalence of Diabetes and CKD by Race/Ethnicity 2015 
Race/Ethnicity All Medicare Medicare Aged <65 Medicare Aged >65 
 Diabetes CKD Diabetes CKD Diabetes CKD 
Non-Hispanic White 24.4% 17.4% 22.6% 12.7% 24.7% 18.2% 
Black/African American 36.6% 24.9% 30.6% 21.3% 39.8% 26.7% 
Hispanic 36.5% 19.5% 32.5% 18.7% 37.9% 19.8% 
Asian/Pacific Islanders 34.0% 17.9% 27.8% 18.8% 34.9% 17.7% 
American Indians/Alaska 
Natives 
38.0% 20.8% 33.0% 18.1% 40.4% 22.1% 
 
 22 
 
In 2015, nationally for all beneficiaries, Medicare spent $15,920 per capita on individuals 
with diabetes.  In the same year, the per capita spending on individuals with chronic kidney 
disease was $25,668.  In 2015, the prevalence of the chronic condition dyad diabetes and chronic 
kidney disease was 14.7%, with a per capita cost of $24,481.  Because gender is also a risk factor 
for many chronic conditions, it is interesting to note the prevalence of this dyad in the male 
population was 17.0% versus 12.9% in the female population.  A diabetic patient with chronic 
kidney disease requires on average nearly $10,000 a year more to treat than a diabetic patient 
without chronic kidney disease.  If the chronic kidney disease progresses to End-Stage Renal 
Disease (ESRD) which requires dialysis, the per capita spending increases to nearly $90,000.   
While some debate exists as to the relevance of HbA1c in Type II diabetes, and 
consequences do exist should blood sugar levels get below a certain threshold, management and 
lowering of HbA1c is still an important part of diabetic care (Giugliano et al., 2015; Wilson & 
Perry, 2009). 
The relevance of these data points to this research becomes obvious.  Controlling for 
age/gender and risk combinations through the HCC risk score and race/ethnicity, if one structure 
associates to a lower percent of the diabetic population out-of-control for HbA1c, the historical 
cost data suggest a significant savings opportunity.   
In primary care practice, approximately one-third of office visits are for diabetic care 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010).  A typical approach for the practitioner 
would be to obtain the HbA1c every three months, screen for kidney disease annually, counsel 
the patient on self-management and use pharmacotherapy based on the level of blood sugar 
control. 
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Colon cancer screening.  Screening and detection of colon cancer likewise translates 
directly into Medicare program savings.  The National Colon Cancer Roundtable (2007) 
identified a $15 billion savings opportunity through increasing the rate of colonoscopy in the 
Medicare population aged 50-64.  The savings opportunity associated to increasing stool blood 
testing may be close to $13 billion (National Colorectal Cancer Roundtable, 2007). 
Processes geared to chronic disease management or prevention present a fundamental 
issue.  Namely, while savings associated to prevention may accrue to Medicare they may not 
accrue to the ACO or HMO because the investment in prevention may avert future spending by 
which time the beneficiary may no longer be attributed to the ACO or enrolled in the HMO.  This 
paradox exists in VBP arrangements in terms of identifying the recipients of the “value” created 
which may not include either patients or payors (Tanenbaum, 2016).  
At a macro level, the incentives created by Medicare in both programmatic approaches 
through the ACO and HMO are cost-oriented with the attainment of quality measures being a 
“ticket to play.”  In other words, ACO or HMO realization of the micro-level savings and the 
temporal relationship to the resources expended in the prevention of future disease states may be 
disconnected or unavailable.   
ER utilization.  On the other hand, the financial benefit to ACOs and HMOs in 
preventing unnecessary ER utilization seems more apparent.  Of the 130 million ER visits 
nationwide in 2013, persons aged 65 and older accounted for 20.7 million.  The semi-urgent and 
non-urgent visits numbered 16.3 million in the same age group (CDC, 2013).  These visits 
frequently result in imaging, procedures or prescriptions (Honigman, Wiler, Rooks, & Ginde, 
2013).  Nationally, in 2015 for all Medicare beneficiaries ER visits per thousand for individuals 
with diabetes were 1,010, CKD 1,494 and cancer 1,018.  This means on average individuals with 
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one of these conditions will present in the ER at least once each year.  Over the three 
performance years of the MSSP ACO program (2013-2015) average ER visits per 1,000 actually 
increased from 323 to 731.  Over the same time in all Medicare Advantage plans ER visits per 
1,000 changed from 479 to 497.  In the example of the ACO and HMO PCPs whose patient 
needs immediate care but does not need to visit the ER, this may provide some evidence of the 
physician-level incentives to intervene and prevent an unnecessary ER visit in the HMO and how 
at the individual practitioner level the same incentive may not exist in the ACO.  The HMO 
creates this incentive by sharing financial risk with the PCP.  The ACO lacks this ability because 
ACO attributed beneficiaries are by definition FFS beneficiaries and may present in the ER 
based on their own personal decision.  Viewing these incentives through the SPO, it would be 
appropriate to say the incentives created by CMS through the HMO program result in a structural 
response to alter provider incentives.  The providers respond through care processes to take 
advantage of these incentives.   
The incentives created through policy and payment mechanism in the ACO or HMO 
structure are an area for additional inquiry.  In the SPO, these incentives exist in the structures 
and create the differences in provider participation, patient choice, and payment methods used by 
the ACO/HMO.  These differences then determine processes, which in turn produce outcomes. 
 Overall, Medicare clearly has a goal of reducing costs.  The ACO and HMO programs 
are only two of the models currently in use, but collectively cover a very large part of the 
Medicare population.  These ACOs and HMOs may invest in disease management or prevention 
programs designed to further attain quality measures and reduce costs.  However, the benefit of 
the cost reduction may occur in the future perhaps after the beneficiary who would use resources 
is no longer part of the ACO or HMO.  Understanding better the extent to which one approach 
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may outperform another may be important to setting payment policy designed to steer 
organizations into that preferred model.     
Outcome 
In the SPO, outcome is the effect.  It is where evidence of differences or changes in 
structure and/or process become evident.  Assessing outcome requires knowledge of the 
relationships between structure and process (A. Donabedian, 1988).  In outcomes research, this is 
almost by definition the dependent variable.   
In approaches like the one used in this study, relying on publicly available data, structure 
may be easily observed but with less definition as to quantification of differences.  Process may 
be more obscure making differences or changes more difficult to detect.  Outcome may be the 
most easily measured, even if differences in the levels of measurement exist.  Multiple systems 
of outcome measurement exist and form the basis for most VPB arrangements, like in the case of 
HEDIS and NQF measures used by HMOs and ACOs, respectively.   
Outcome is a result.  It might describe a snapshot of a moment in time, like a blood sugar 
measurement.  Outcome might also describe what quality measures typically refer to as a process 
measure, but would not be process relative to the SPO, like a cancer screening.  Not unlike the 
grey area sometimes existing between structure and process, some obscurity exists between 
process and outcome.  In the case of a cancer screening, the completion of that screening would 
be an outcome whereas the recommendation to screen and discussion concerning need would be 
part of the technical process in the SPO.   
Cost and utilization could be debated as to whether they represent outcomes.  Donabedian 
seems to have evolved his thinking over time on this subject particularly regarding the inclusion 
of cost in determining efficacy.  (A. Donabedian, 2003; R. C. Donabedian A. et al., 1982).  Since 
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many, if not most or all, VBP arrangements include cost/utilization measures they are close to 
being de facto outcome measures. 
Judgements as to the benefit of outcomes is often an area for debate.  In the areas of 
chronic disease management, like diabetes, typically lower HbA1c would be better.  But, this is 
not an absolute and there are disagreements as to the role of HbA1c in the case of Type II 
diabetes particularly regarding serious complications of diabetes (Wilson & Perry, 2009).  
Generally, cancer screening is thought to be beneficial but again this is not an absolute as in the 
case of Prostate Specific Antigen testing to screen for prostate cancer (Cohn et al., 2014).  
Cost/utilization may be particularly difficult to assess in terms of benefit.  Who is to say less cost 
is necessarily better?  Some argue, at the macroeconomic level, the issue of the US NHE at 17% 
of the GDP is the value extracted as a result of the spend rather than the amount of that spending 
in the aggregate (Fuchs, 2010). 
Conclusions 
The data on ACOs overall is nascent.  The MSSP plans completed the third performance 
year in calendar 2015 for early adopters.  Some ACOs have only one or two years of 
performance data through 2016.  Many Medicare Advantage HMOs have much longer tenure 
with plan start dates in the mid-1980s through the 1990s. 
In the SPO framework, these organizations represent distinct structures and as such are a 
basis for quality comparison.  Donabedian referred to structure as “blunt instruments” of quality 
assessment which should be a “major preoccupation” in system design (A. Donabedian, 1988).  
Figure 2 depicts the SPO and highlights the relationship of the different structures between 
ACOs and HMOs within the framework. 
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The incentives created by and through these programs exist in structure, becoming 
activated through process.  Methodologically, comparing quality between these organization 
structures poses some challenges as will be discussed.  The lack of a quality comparison between 
Medicare ACOs and HMOs is a gap in the existing literature.  This study seeks to close this gap, 
at least in part, by using several dependent variables from HEDIS and NQF measures to analyze 
possible differences in quality of care through the use of a small sub-set of these measures where 
congruence in the population measured and level of measurement exists. 
Shifting the perspective of structure slightly to view it through the number of 
beneficiaries served reveals a potential difference in the ability of these organizations to generate 
a return on investment (ROI).  Because the number of beneficiaries relates to the number of 
providers, locations for service deliver, etc., this view of structure is appropriate in the SPO 
framework.  The size of the population served and implications for ROI then raises questions 
concerning the ability to manage quality measures more effectively in larger populations because 
ROI is ultimately a function of medical expenses savings and quality measure attainment. 
The two “slices” through structure inform the research questions of this study.  First, 
across the various quality measures comparable between HMOs and ACOs, does one model 
perform better than the other?  Second, do differences exist in the attainment of these plan 
comparable quality measures based on the size of the beneficiary population served? 
In creating these structures with attendant incentives, CMS may be trying to obtain 
something very difficult to get:  changes in provider behavior that are inconsistent with the 
provider best interest.  In the risk-sharing model of the HMO, the provider will want to reduce 
expenses in the same time-period of the pre-payment of services.  Expending resources to lower 
a patient’s blood glucose now with an associated cost savings in the future creates misalignment.  
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In the ACO model, expending resources now to lower a patient’s blood sugar may exhibit the 
same lack of temporal relationship between investment and return.  In addition, the ACO 
provider may have an incentive to increase the frequency of contact with that patient, and 
generate FFS payments, which does not necessarily align with the ACO incentive to reduce 
costs.  
In both structures, the early detection and treatment of colon cancer can reduce cost.  
Investing resources that will lower expenditures in the contract period with a positive ROI is 
something CMS can almost universally count on providers to do.  The contingency would be 
detecting a treatable cancer.  Because the screening interval is ten years, many cancers will 
develop after a negative screening.  Consuming resources to not find treatable cancers again 
hinders access to financial incentives for the providers.  The availability of services may also be 
different because ACO beneficiaries could receive screening through any Part B provider 
whereas HMO beneficiaries must use in-network providers.  Because ACOs must meet 
benchmarks on quality measures to be eligible for shared savings, if savings occur in excess of 
the threshold, the incentive for ACOs is different from HMOs.  The HMOs may receive a quality 
bonus based on the Stars Rating, but the cost savings associated to detecting early stage disease 
creates a direct financial incentive.  If the ACO design is indeed based on quality and 
coordination of care, then it is reasonable to expect they have a higher colon cancer screening 
rate. 
The prevention of unnecessary ER utilization creates diverging incentives between these 
structures.  In the HMO, the provider may have financial risk and the beneficiary may as well, 
when beneficiaries seek care in the ER for non or semi-urgent services.  In the former, if the PCP 
authorizes a non-urgent ER visit they may have to “pay” for the service through their capitation.  
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In the latter, the beneficiary may have to pay out of pocket the entire cost of a non-urgent ER 
service not pre-authorized by the PCP.  The ACO beneficiary would have the same cost sharing 
resulting from an ER services regardless of acuity or need.  The PCP may not even be aware 
until after the fact as the FFS beneficiary can chose to seek services in the ER at any time.   
As a result of these incentives, the hypotheses are the ACO beneficiaries are in better 
blood sugar control and a higher proportion receive colon cancer screening.  The HMO 
beneficiaries should exhibit lower ER utilization.  The hypotheses based on the size of the 
population served are that larger organizations have more patients in blood sugar control, a 
higher proportion screened for colon cancer and lower ER utilization.  This is because the issue 
of ROI is much easier to leverage across a larger population.  This research will examine the 
publicly available data to see if these hypotheses hold up based on the two views of structure.   
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Chapter 3:  Literature Review 
 
 
Introduction 
This literature review constitutes a comprehensive examination of the peer-reviewed 
literature concerning comparisons of cost, quality and/or access between payment systems, 
within payment systems and between delivery models and payment systems.  It includes non-
peer reviewed materials in the form of dissertations and reports by not-for-profit or industry 
organizations.  Despite the lack of peer review, the information obtained from not-for-profit or 
industry reports summarized mostly publicly reported data from a variety of sources, e.g., The 
Kaiser Family Foundation report on total HMO enrollment. 
I performed a systematic search of peer-review articles in August 2016, using PubMed 
and Google Scholar.  This literature review focuses primarily on Medicare because the sampling 
frame of this study is Medicare Advantage HMOs and Medicare ACOs.  Follow-up references in 
retrieved articles supplement this systematic search.  Search terms included:  Medicare 
advantage, accountable care organization, healthcare cost, healthcare access, healthcare quality, 
managed care, HMO, fee-for-service, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, National Quality 
Foundation (NQF) and HEDIS.  Results in each search iteration included variations of terms, 
e.g., healthcare cost became “analysis, cost.”  These literature searches identified 1,723 peer-
reviewed publications.  Sorting these publications by the PubMed Identification number 
indicates 233 references returned for more than one of the above searches. 
Studies selected for further review followed these inclusion criteria: 
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1. Reflected an attempt to compare quality, or cost or outcomes between payment models, 
within payment models or payment models to delivery models. 
2. Used HEDIS or NQF measures as outcomes variables. 
3. Identified Medicare Advantage as independent variable. 
Based on these inclusion criteria, 78 studies merited additional review.  Of these, only 15 
previous investigations were directly relevant to the research questions of this study.  The 
following is a discussion and evaluation of these studies by theme.   
Quality Measurement in Medicare Advantage and ACOs   
Medicare Advantage plans report quality measures using the HEDIS measures.  Medicare 
ACOs use quality measures from the NQF.  As we will see in the methods chapter, these 
dimensions of quality measurement do not line up exactly.  This disconnection in the domains 
and levels of quality measurement no doubt speaks to the lack of a “template” approach.  The 
body of evidence regarding head-to-head comparisons between financing and delivery 
mechanisms is scant generally, and specifically within Medicare programs.  Interplan 
comparisons within Medicare Advantage however are routine and actually support the Star 
Ratings System Medicare uses to evaluate these plans (Gold, 2009; Herman, 2015).   
Survey of Existing Literature 
The literature reveals mixed findings in comparing between payment models, within 
payment models and payment models to delivery models with regard to quality and cost.  In 
general, HMOs when compared to FFS arrangements tend to be lower cost with some indications 
of lower quality, particularly for at-risk populations, e.g., the elderly, minorities or those with 
chronic conditions (Davidson, 1997; Hellinger, 1998; Miller & Luft, 1997).  In Medicare 
specifically, the results from Medicare Advantage to FFS comparisons tend to follow the same 
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pattern:  Medicare Advantage may demonstrate less cost but the trade-off may be lower quality 
particularly for at-risk populations and other demographics.  Because the ACO is a relatively 
new delivery/payment model, direct comparisons of ACO performance to other delivery or 
payment models appear not to exist.   
Comparisons between models.  Several important studies from the mid-to-late 1990s 
help identify important differences in results based on model.  These studies used dependent 
variables essentially similar to HEDIS or NQF, but not actual HEDIS or NQF measures, or used 
patient self-assessment via the 36-Item Short Form Survey.  All were observational.  The 
research questions posed were all variations on the “which one is better?” theme.  Six studies 
were head-to-head comparisons between a managed care product, HMO or Medicare Advantage, 
and a FFS product.  The unit of analysis in each case was patient-level.   
All but one study generated data from administrative/claims records.  Davidson, et al 
(1997) audited medical charts to derive measurements for dependent variables.  If differences 
existed in the dependent variables based on structure, the independent variable in each of these 
investigations, they were minor and typically favored FFS models for clinical measure 
improvement/change and HMO/Medicare Advantage models for utilization/cost measures.  
Some findings demonstrated selection bias in the plan design resulting in less favorable 
outcomes for at-risk populations (Retchin et al., 1992; Ware, Bayliss, Rogers, Kosinki, & Tarlov, 
1996).    
Methods, sample sizes, power and risk adjustment.  Alpha levels were uniformly set 
at .05.  Power calculation discussions were uniformly absent.  The methodological approach in 
virtually all of these investigations was a detection of group differences through t-Test.  Where 
not specifically discussed, the tabular data presented and discussion of results clearly indicated a 
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test of mean differences likely using a t-Test.  Using G*Power 3.1.9.2 to calculate the necessary 
sample size at α=.05 with β=.80 for a 2-tailed t-Test indicates group samples of 394, each, are 
necessary to detect small effects.  Sample sizes ranged from 353 charts to over 5 million 
observations.  Insufficient power may be problematic for Davidson (1997), and Cohen, et al 
(2012).  Only one study used a risk adjustment methodology (Brennan & Shepard, 2010).  The 
lack of risk adjustment is a limitation generally in the literature of this approach reviewed for this 
study. 
Summary of results. Table 5 illustrates the purpose, methods/variables, design/sample 
and conclusions from each of these approaches.  
Table 5:  Summary of Literature Findings 
Author(s) Year Purpose/Research Question Methods/Variables Design/Sample Conclusions 
Silcox et al 2003 Determine differences in quality of 
care between FFS and HMO for 
CHF post-hospitalization 
t-Test (2 sample), 
data extracted by 
chart review, Odds 
Ratio to Relative 
Risk by insurance 
plan and outcome 
for:  mortality, 30-
day readmission, 
ACE inhibitor use, 
2-week follow-up 
visit, discharge 
instructions 
Observational, 
case control.  
154 subjects, 
ages 19-98 
stratified by 
attending MD, 
chart review. 
Slightly shorter 
ALOS for 
HMO.  No 
differences in 
mortality OR.  
HMO with 
higher 
readmission.  
No significant 
differences by 
attending 
specialty.  No 
differences in 
follow-up or 
discharge 
instructions 
Ware et al 1996 Compare outcomes of chronically 
ill between HMO and FFS 
t-Test (2 tail)                         
SF-36 
Observational, 
4-year.  2,235 
patients with 
NIDDM, HTN, 
Acute MI, HF, 
Depression, 
1986-1990 
No average 
differences.  
Elderly showed 
more decline in 
HMO for 
physical 
function but 
mental function 
better.  Lower 
poverty levels 
did better in 
FFS, higher 
income levels 
did better in 
HMO 
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Table 5:  Continued 
Author(s) Year Purpose/Research Question Methods/Variables Design/Sample Conclusions 
Davidson 1997 Which model is better for DM 
care, MA or FFS? 
HbA1c level plus 5 
process measures:  
eye exam, kidney 
screening, HbA1c 
screening, foot 
exam, lipid panel.  
Includes number of 
PCP visits and 
specialty referrals, 
likely t-Test 
353 audited charts ADA standards not 
met, generally.  FFS 
slightly better. 
Brennan & 
Shepard 
2010 Compare clinical quality of 
care between MA and FFS 
11 HEDIS process 
measures, mean 
differences 
Sociodemographic 
adjustment 
MA better on 8 of 
11, FFS better on 3, 
newer measures 
Cohen et al 2012 Does an MA Special Needs 
Plan (SNP) improve care for 
patients with NIDDM 
Annual utilization 
rates:  admissions 
and LOS, hospital 
outpatient visits, 
physician office 
visits 
12 months of 
beneficiary level 
data for FFS and 
Care Improvement 
Plus (SNP) 
SNP had lower 
admissions, shorter 
LOS, less hospital 
outpatient visits, 
greater physician 
office visits 
compared to FFS 
Landon et 
al 
2012 Compare MA and FFS 
utilization patterns 
HEDIS utilization:  
med/surg 
hospitalization, 
outpatient visits, 
ambulatory surgery, 
ER visits plus 12 
specific surgical 
procedures, t-Test 
(2 tailed) 
Matched samples:  
3.1M MA in 2003 to 
5.7M in 2009.  5.0M 
in FFS 2003 to 5.6M 
2009 
MA HMO patients 
used fewer services 
Landon et 
al 
2015 Compare utilization MA v. 
FFS for DM and CV disease 
HEDIS plus RRU 
(created for FFS 
with administrative 
data).  IP utilization, 
E&M services, 
surgeries, ED visits.  
Quality measures 
for LDL and HbA1c 
screening plus eye 
exam, likely t-test 
Matched FFS 
samples.  MA 
sample:  680,000 
w/DM, 270,000 
w/CV disease.  20% 
national FFS sample 
MA had lower RRU 
and ED visits.  
More established 
MA plans had 
lower RRU with 
higher quality 
compared to newer 
plans 
 
Comparisons within models.  The results of comparisons based on HEDIS measures 
drive the “Star Rating” methodology CMS uses to assess Medicare Advantage plan performance.  
The Star Ratings directly affect plan incentive payments.  One commonality between Medicare 
Advantage plans appears to exist:  favorable selection (Newhouse, Price, McWilliams, Hsu, & 
McGuire, 2014).  This phenomenon is well known, understood and quantifiable (Newhouse et 
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al., 2014).  In recent years, however, the implementation of the HCC risk scoring methodology 
may be moderating the effect (McWilliams, Hsu, & Newhouse, 2012).   
In the comparison of Medicare Advantage plans one interesting finding was the better 
performance of not-for-profit plans (McBean, Jung, & Virnig, 2005).  This is consistent with 
findings regarding HMO-to-HMO performance in previous efforts (Himmelstein, Woolhandler, 
Hellander, & Wolfe, 1999; B. Landon & Epstein, 2001).  Typically not-for-profit Medicare 
Advantage plans demonstrate better quality (Xu, Burgess, Cabral, Soria-Saucedo, & Kazis, 
2015).  To the extent quality of care overall was roughly equal in these comparisons, some 
subgroups did experience poorer outcomes based on plan design (McBean et al., 2005).  
Variation in plan performance clearly exists as evidenced by the variation in Star Ratings.  In 
2012, the total percent of Medicare Advantage plans with a 4 or 5 Star Rating was 20%, and this 
increased to 40% in 2016 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). 
Sources of variation.  The literature seems consistent as to the source of these variations 
including:  favorable or unfavorable selection, not-for-profit or for profit status, age of the plan 
and plan experience with specific measures.  One interesting phenomenon in Medicare 
Advantage plans appears to be the willingness of beneficiaries to change plan if the Star Rating 
is one level higher (Reid, Deb, Howell, & Shrank, 2013).  Medicare permits beneficiaries to quit 
their current plan and enroll in a five-star plan at any time, even off-cycle from open enrollment 
periods.  Generally speaking, the literature in this domain is sparse, which may mostly be 
attributable to the existence of the Star Ratings methodology derived largely from HEDIS 
measures.   
One of the most relevant approaches, examining variations in diabetic care based on plan 
case mix, used multivariate methods (Abraham, Marmor, Knutson, Zeglin, & Virnig, 2012).  In 
 37 
 
this study, case-mix associated to quality with a modest effect size.  In other words, more 
favorable case-mix would result in higher quality.   
Summary.  Variation exists between Medicare Advantage plans as to quality.  Some of 
this is attributable to case-mix or selection.  Some variance may occur based on not-for-profit or 
for-profit status with not-for-profit plans generally outperforming for-profit plans.  Because 
HEDIS measures serve as the basis for Star Ratings, the overall rating for Medicare Advantage 
plans, much of the research effort in comparing Medicare Advantage plans focused on chronic 
conditions like DM. 
Comparisons of integrated delivery systems to medicare advantage.  While no 
standard definition of an Integrated Delivery System (IDS) exists, the term suggests information 
sharing and coordination of care through established relationships between providers (Hwang, 
Chang, Laclair, & Paz, 2013).  This theme exists also in Medicare’s description of ACOs:  
groups of physicians and other providers who come together voluntarily to offer high quality, 
coordinated, care to beneficiaries.   
Comparisons of IDSs to Medicare Advantage are meaningful because many IDSs are 
financing models as well.  For instance the VA Health System is a self-contained financing and 
delivery structure.  The ACO is similar in this regard with what is a FFS payment structure 
existing, prior to MIPS, between a delivery model and a secondary payment model via the shared 
savings opportunity.    
Many IDSs have, or are developing, provider-sponsored Medicare Advantage plans as 
well.  A trend towards having multiple track MSSP ACOs and a Medicare Advantage plan seems 
to be developing as a strategy to gain more experience with managing population risk (Gabriel, 
2015). 
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In the literature search one study comparing Medicare Advantage to the VA appeared 
consistently.  It compared elderly patients receiving care in the Veteran’s Administration (VA) 
health system directly with Medicare Advantage on several HEDIS outcomes measures (Trivedi 
& Grebla, 2011).  The independent variable in this study is structure, namely whether the 
individuals received care in the VA or Medicare Advantage.  The dependent variables using 
HEDIS measures were: 
1. HbA1c control 
2. LDL control  
3. Diabetic annual eye exam performed  
4. Blood pressure control  
5. Beta blocker use in hypertension  
6. Mammography screening  
7. Colorectal cancer screening  
In this study, a retrospective cross-sectional design following patients between 2000 and 
2007, the VA outperformed Medicare Advantage with the performance gap widening over the 
years (Trivedi & Grebla, 2011).  The sample included 293,554 patients in 142 VA medical 
centers and 5,768,573 enrolled in 305 Medicare Advantage plans.  Significant covariates 
included age group, gender, Census division, proportion of persons age 65 and older in the 
enrollee’s ZIP code with income less than the federal poverty level, and proportion with at least 
some college education.  The authors applied a risk adjustment method based on individual 
demographic characteristics, income and education.  Because the VA does not use HEDIS 
measures, the authors re-stated internal VA measures, called the “External Peer Review 
Program” (EPRP), relative to the HEDIS definitions.  This study is remarkably similar in terms 
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of content and approach.  It is a direct comparison between Medicare Advantage and another 
structure, the VA Health Sytsem, and applied the General Linear Model (GLM) to analyze the 
data.  However, the main author subsequently identified a significant weakness when examining 
the same individuals receiving care in the VA and Medicare Advantage (Trivedi et al., 2016).  
The issue relates to the structural differences between Medicare Advantage and VA.  The 
conclusion was the Medicare Advantage plans simply under-report performance as they take data 
from their contracted providers.  At the same time, because ACOs also self-report based on the 
sampling guidelines, this inherent weakness in reporting method exists in both structures.   
Administrative Data in Healthcare Outcomes Research 
As more and more data become available for researchers, the convenience and cost 
savings associated to using administrative data is making its use more common.  Administrative 
data has limitations, perhaps prime among these is the fact that its primary use is not for research 
purposes (Fung, Brand, Newhouse, & Hsu, 2011; Hashimoto, Brodt, Skelly, & Dettori, 2014).  
Research using patient-level data can be difficult to complete and poses its own challenges in 
terms of validity.  A reasonable approach to comparing quality differences in Medicare HMOs 
and ACOs would be to compare patient-level outcomes data.  This would be possible for 
Medicare HMOs, as CMS maintains beneficiary-level data including HEDIS-linked Category II 
CPT Codes.  No such database exists for Medicare FFS beneficiaries.  So, the next best 
alternative is to take the data that is publicly available and make comparisons where congruence 
exists between outcomes measures used in both models.  The research questions and hypotheses 
flow from the nature of the data available.   
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The purpose of this study is to examine differences quality relative to enrollment in a 
Medicare Advantage HMO or attribution to an ACO.  The results of previous studies of different 
models demonstrate varying conclusions.  This may be especially true when viewing outcomes 
in the aggregate, i.e., at the population level, without detailed examination of the impact to sub-
populations, e.g., the frail, elderly or economically disadvantaged.   
The research questions relate directly to the differences in structure between Medicare 
Advantage HMOs and ACOs and explore two themes:  the role of structure, HMO or ACO, on 
chronic disease management, cancer prevention screening and utilization; the impact of the size 
of the population served on chronic disease management, cancer prevention screening and 
utilization.  Both HEDIS and NQF define other measures of all these dimensions of care.  
Unfortunately, very little alignment exists between HEDIS and NQF except for the three 
outcome measures used in this study.   
Conclusions 
The dearth of literature studying head-to-head measurements of quality based on 
structure clearly demonstrates the need for more study.  Previous works explored differences 
within and between models, e.g., Medicare Advantage to Medicare Advantage, Medicare 
Advantage to FFS, with more emphasis on comparing Medicare Advantage to Medicare FFS.  
Much of the early focus in these efforts was cost-based or based on self-perception of health 
status.  Medicare Advantage plans are the only Medicare products consistently using HEDIS 
measures.  Although both the ACO and Medicare Advantage HMOs use similar but not identical 
outcomes measures, no studies appear in the current literature comparing these models.  Track 1 
MSSP ACOs are only in the fourth performance year, in 2016, for the oldest of these 
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organizations so the lack of comparison is understandable.  The number of Medicare 
beneficiaries in an ACO or Medicare Advantage plan is, however, quite large and projected to 
increase over time.  With the repeal of the sustainable growth rate (SGR) methodology to annual 
Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS) updates and the new pressures pushing providers toward 
Advanced APM, the financial risk in providing care to a Medicare population will increase 
(Civic Impulse, 2016).   
Financial pressure on the Medicare Trust Fund requires relief through some model able to 
not only control costs but improve population health status, at least insofar as defined through the 
current set of quality measures.  CMS clearly has an interest in identifying this ideal model as it 
continues to promulgate new rules and programs designed to elicit these responses.  This study is 
an early contribution to the examination of quality differences in Medicare HMOs and ACOs.  
While narrow in focus it appears unlike anything currently published.   
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Chapter 4:  Methods 
 
 
Introduction 
This study is an examination of performance on several outcome indicators for Medicare 
beneficiaries receiving care through the Medicare Track 1 MSSP ACOs and Medicare Advantage 
HMO plans.  These indicators, the dependent variables, are:  percent of population with diabetes 
mellitus and most recent HbA1c > 9.0%, percent population screened for colon cancer based on 
age-group, and Emergency Room (ER) visits per 1,000 beneficiaries not resulting in hospital 
admission.  These outcomes describe clinical, prevention and utilization outcomes.  The purpose 
of this chapter is to elucidate the rationale for the design and methods, describe the analytic 
procedure and explain the process of interpreting results. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions are as follows: 
1. Do Medicare ACOs have a greater percent of population with diabetes mellitus and most 
recent HbA1c > 9.0% than HMOs, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score 
and plan years of operations? 
2.  Do Medicare ACOs have a greater percent of population screened for colon cancer than 
HMOs, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years of 
operations? 
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3. Do Medicare ACOs have lower ER utilization per 1,000 not resulting in hospital 
admission than HMOs, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan 
years of operations? 
4. Do ACOs and HMOs serving larger beneficiary populations have fewer patients with 
diabetes mellitus and most recent HbA1c>9.0%, controlling for race/ethnicity, average 
HCC risk score and plan years of operations? 
5. Do ACOs and HMOs serving larger beneficiary populations have more patients screened 
for colon cancer, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years of 
operations? 
6. Do ACOs and HMOs serving larger beneficiary populations have fewer ER visits per 
1,000 not resulting in hospital admission, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk 
score and plan years of operations? 
The hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1:  Medicare ACOs have fewer diabetic patients with last HbA1c > 9.0% 
 Hypothesis 2:  Medicare ACOs screen more age-appropriate patients for colon cancer. 
 Hypothesis 3:  Medicare HMOs have fewer ER visits per 1,000 not resulting in hospital 
admission. 
 Hypothesis 4:  Organizations serving larger populations will have fewer diabetic patients 
with last HbA1c > 9.0% 
 Hypothesis 5:  Organizations serving larger populations will have a higher rate of colon 
cancer screening. 
 Hypothesis 6:  Organizations serving larger populations will have fewer ER visits per 
1,000 not resulting in hospital admission. 
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Design and Approach 
This study is non-experimental and retrospective.  The data come from CMS publicly 
available data for Medicare HMOs and ACOs through various CMS sources.  Multiple databases 
containing information on each model require concatenation to align data elements for analysis.  
Data sources are used only if it is possible to link them through an identification number 
consistently used between the files.   
The analysis will use multiple hierarchical regression and input variables into the 
equation through a series of steps.  The first variables will be the control variables, input in three 
discrete steps.  The independent variables will be group (HMO or ACO) and total beneficiary 
enrollment.  The dependent variables will be the quality measures.  The model will return the 
unstandardized beta weights and significance at each step allowing for interpretation of the 
impact of the control or independent variable on the outcome.  
Threats to validity.  Internal validity is a concern because HMO and ACO providers 
self-report quality data.  The providers in Medicare Advantage plans self-report HEDIS measures 
to CMS through the claims adjudication process and if not the HMO plans audit patient-level 
encounter data to extract the information.  ACOs report attainment on quality measures based on 
a patient sampling methodology identified by Medicare (RTI International, 2015).  Because the 
design is retrospective, utilizing secondary data, there are no procedures available to test 
equipment and verify lab controls, training protocols or data entry accuracy.   
The primary threat to external validity is simply that the main purpose of the data used is 
not research.  It is administrative data.  In the cases of Medicare Advantage HMOs and ACOs 
these data support decisions regarding program incentives and payment which are outcome-
oriented.  Another threat to validity is selection bias.  Although the amount of favorable selection 
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in Medicare Advantage is perhaps less today than in previous years, it may possibly remain 
(Mello, Stearns, Norton, & Ricketts, 2003).  Some selection bias may also be occurring in ACOs.  
For instance the percent of population with diabetes mellitus and most recent HbA1c > 9.0%, in 
year one of operations, was lower in 2015 compared to 2013 for plans starting in those years.  
Why this may be is not discernable but it could be a result of “design” relative to populations 
managed through ACOs in some organizations particularly when those organizations participate 
in other population-based models.  As age is a risk factor for virtually all chronic conditions, and 
because so many baby boomers are aging into Medicare, it could also be the average beneficiary 
age in the newly starting ACOs is lower.  However, because the average HCC risk score, and 
beneficiary race (White or not-White) and duration of operations are control variables in this 
study the issue of selection bias is less concerning.  It would be better to match individual 
beneficiaries in cohorts based on HCC risk score, and other factors, to further protect external 
validity but this is not possible with the publicly available data.   
Subjects.  This is a non-experimental, and due to the aggregate level of the publicly 
available data it is not a human subjects study (Department of Health and Human Services, 
2009).  No patient identifiable information exists in the publicly available CMS data.  All data 
available through CMS is at the ACO or HMO level.  Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval 
is not necessary (Department of Health and Human Services, 2009).   
Sample.  In the first set of research questions, the outcomes relate to how many 
beneficiaries in either an ACO or HMO meet certain criteria.  As such, the sample power derives 
from the number of beneficiaries included.  In the second set of research questions, the outcomes 
relate to the size of the beneficiary population meeting certain criteria receive care through the 
ACOs and HMOs.  Again, the sample power derives from the number of beneficiaries included 
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rather than the number of ACOs and HMOs.  This is consistent with other similar approaches 
identified in the literature review (Trivedi & Grebla, 2011). 
In total, ACO attribution and Medicare Advantage enrollment is slightly less than half of 
the 55M Medicare beneficiaries in total in 2016.  Including all Track 1 MSSP ACOs and 
Medicare Advantage HMOs operating in 2015, in the sampling frame yields 609 total plans 
serving 17,898,330 beneficiaries.  There are 226 HMOs with an average of 47,941 enrolled 
beneficiaries and 383 ACOs with an average of 18,708 attributed beneficiaries. 
Sample size calculations used the software package G*Power 3.1.9.2 specifying α=.05 
and β=.80, and a small (.10) effect size.  The calculation for R2 change in multiple regression 
using two independent predictors indicates a sample size of 100 is the minimum necessary to 
achieve the desired power.   
Risk adjustment.  Risk adjustment methodologies are imperfect and can never 
completely account for differences in populations (Lane-Fall & Neuman, 2013b).   Adjusting risk 
is particularly important, however, in the use of administrative data to analyze outcomes 
(Sernyak & Rosenheck, 2003).  Sufficient detail does not exist in the CMS publicly reported data 
to use it for risk adjustment between the organization types, e.g., geographical dispersion of 
plans.  Different data are reported for HMOs and ACOs.  However, the publicly available data 
does report average HCC risk score at the plan level for Medicare Advantage.  The ACO publicly 
available performance data reports average HCC risk score for several populations in the ACO:  
the disabled, end-stage renal disease, aged non-dual eligibility and aged dual eligibility.  
Weighting these average HCC risk scores by the number of beneficiaries in those categories 
within the population of each ACO returns the weighted average HCC risk score for the entire 
ACO population.  Using the plan-specific average HCC risk score provides a solid basis for 
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adjustment.  The HCC risk score factors chronic conditions, age/gender, and disability/ESRD 
status in the calculation methodology.  Also, if a beneficiary became Medicaid eligible during the 
calculation year, the HCC risk score factors this in the final score for that beneficiary.  This 
provides some level of socioeconomic risk adjustment because Medicaid eligibility implicates 
lower economic status.   
Based on the distribution of ACO and HMO beneficiaries, further risk adjustment to 
incorporate variation in socioeconomic factors based on geography would not be meaningful.  
The distribution of these beneficiaries reveals significant overlap as shown on the density map in 
Figure 3. 
Data Sources and Collection 
The secondary outcome data come from two sources:  CMS publicly available data for 
HMOs and ACOs.  The performance and demographic data for both exist in separate datasets 
and require concatenation to be useful.  Concatenation is possible using unique identification 
codes common to the datasets for each.  These sets for HMOs and ACOs do not appear with 
consistent record layouts.  Constructing a dataset for analysis requires manual effort to populate 
data elements using a taxonomy and record layout useful for the analysis.    
Medicare HMO plans may operate in multiple geographies each representing a different 
case in the data sets.  Each contract with CMS has a unique identifier as do the plans under each 
contract.  For instance, an insurance company might bid for multiple plans in different 
geographies.  Each plan award has an identification code with all plans under the same company 
using the same contract identification code.  Summary data by plan code is obtainable by 
concatenating these data sets at the level of the contract identification code 
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Data Exploration and Cleaning 
All data exploration, cleaning and analysis will occur in SPSS v. 24.   Using the unique 
code identifier for each plan, a new dataset will be constructed with the following elements: 
1. ID Number:  ACO number of HMO contract ID code. 
2. Cohort:  0 for HMOs, 1 for ACOs. 
3. Plan start date. 
4. Years of operations, based on an end date of December 31, 2015. 
5. Total beneficiaries in calendar year 2015. 
6. HbA1c:  percent population with most recent HbA1c > 9.0%. 
7. ColonCA:  percent population screened for colon cancer. 
8. ERVisits:  ER visits per 1,000 population not resulting in hospital admission. 
9. Average HCC Risk score:  published for HMOs, calculated weighted average for ACOs. 
10. White:  percent of population identified as Caucasian. 
11. Non-White:  percent of population in all other race/ethnic categories.   
Data cleaning.  After producing descriptive statistics, identification of non-normal 
distributions will occur through visualization of histograms.  Identification of univariate outliers 
will occur by calculating the Z-score associated to each case and variable.  A multiple regression 
procedure using a dummy DV with all CVs and DVs specified above entered as IVs will 
facilitate the identification of multivariate outliers based on the Mahalanobis distance.  Decisions 
about case deletion, missing data replacement or data transformations will depend on the cause 
of the outlier.  The preferred approach, while preserving minimum cell sizes, is to delete cases.  
If this is not possible, transforming the data based on the nature of the variable will be the next 
 50 
 
option.  Data replacement would next follow with continuous variables replaced by means and 
categorical variables replaced by medians.   
Data transformation.  In the case of skew or kurtosis associated to any DV, the natural 
log can normalize these distributions.  Homoscedasticity will be verified through visualization of 
a residual scatterplot of observed versus predicted values for each DV.  Linearity and 
homogeneity of variance observations will use normal P-P plots of standardized residuals and 
histograms for each DV.  The Mahalanobis distance Chi-Square will guide decisions concerning 
deletion of outlier cases.  As the number of cases exceeds the minimum sample size, based on the 
number of plans, case deletion can occur without sacrificing unnecessarily degrees of freedom.        
Data substitution.   The SPSS Missing Value Analysis (MVA) will depict the pattern of 
missing data and locations of the missing data.  The zero-order correlation matrix will reveal 
possible collinearity between DVs.  Data substitution will only occur in the case of greater than 
5% missing values and then only if the case cannot be deleted.   
Instrumentation 
Because these data are secondary and include a variety of variable types, some 
explanation as to the nature of these variables is appropriate.  It is somewhat difficult to place 
clinical variables in the appropriate context without an understanding of their relevance.   
Clinical outcome.  Measurement of blood sugar frequently occurs in the physician office 
using a “point-of-care” laboratory test called “glycosylated hemoglobin” frequently abbreviated 
HbA1c.  This test essentially uses hemoglobin in the blood to estimate average blood sugar level 
over the previous three months, expressed as a percentage, indicating the concentration of sugar 
in the blood.  Individuals with diabetes mellitus have HbA1c >6.5% at diagnosis although after 
treatment and management may be below 6.5%.   
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The HEDIS measures used by Medicare HMOs report several measures related to 
diabetes mellitus, one of these is the Category II CPT code indicator for HbA1c > 9.0%.  The 
population measures are individuals with Type I and Type II diabetes mellitus.  These are distinct 
clinical entities.  The NQF measures used by Medicare ACOs also report the percent of 
population with most recent HbA1c > 9.0%.  The population measured for NQF is individuals 
with Type II diabetes mellitus.  Because the prevalence of Type I diabetes is less than 5% of all 
diabetes mellitus, the difference between HEDIS and NQF poses no serious threats to validity 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). 
Prevention outcome.  Both HMOs and ACOs offer patients opportunities to undergo 
screening for colon cancer.  The first screening is usually recommended at age 50, with a repeat 
interval of ten years absent a clinical need for a shorter interval.  Screening can take several 
forms including colonoscopy, occult fecal testing or the more recently develop stool DNA 
analysis.  The method of screening is likely less important than getting screened but colonoscopy 
is still considered the “gold standard” by most gastroenterologists.  Both HEDIS and NQF have a 
measure for colon cancer screening rate.  The measures do not differentiate based on type of 
screening.  The population for the HEDIS measure is beneficiaries aged 51-75.  The population 
for the NQF measure is beneficiaries aged 50-74.  While certainly a limitation, the minor 
difference in the age grouping of the screening population for reporting does not invalidate the 
comparison on this measure.   
Utilization outcome.  This measure is identical between HEDIS and NQF.  It is the 
number of ER visits per 1,000 attributed or enrolled that did not result in a hospital admission. 
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Data Analysis 
After appropriate data cleaning, preparation and transformation, three separate multiple 
hierarchical regression models will detect the association between the IVs, HMO or ACO, and 
size of population served, relative to the three DVs:  percent population with diabetes and last 
HbA1c > 9.0%, age-appropriate colon cancer screening rate, and ER visits per 1,000 not 
resulting in hospital admission.  
The research questions and design of this study indicate multiple regression is the 
appropriate test with DVs being continuous, one categorical IV and one continuous IV.  The 
hierarchical model is useful to detect improvements in the model by entering the IVs in a series 
of steps after entering the control variables. 
Control variables.  Identifying appropriate control variables is essentially to understand 
the impact of the IVs at each step in the models.  The data for these variables are part of the 
HMO and ACO datasets discussed earlier.  Issues of normality likely exist, particularly positive 
skew and leptokurtosis.  The log transformation of these variables will make the distributions 
near normal. Differences in publicly available data for HMOs and ACOs to some degree limits 
the effectiveness of these control variables.   
Race/ethnicity.  Percent of population in certain race/ethnicity categories in the public 
data do not directly line up between HMOs and ACOs.  It is for this reason, the control variable 
regarding race/ethnicity will be a dummy variable defined as 0=Caucasian, 1=non-Caucasian.  
Obviously, this would not permit detection of model changes based on sub-categories.  As 
race/ethnicity are risk factors in the case of all three outcomes, this is a weakness of the study 
design but not avoidable.   
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 Duration of operations.  As the literature review indicates, the level of experience with 
quality measures may matter when it comes to reporting attainment of those measures.  The 
influence of tenure of the organization on HEDIS and NQF measures is an area for future 
exploration but out of scope for this study.  Tenure of patients in these organizations would also 
be of interest, but out of scope for this study. 
Duration of operations is a control variable because it will remove the effect of longevity 
and experience with quality measures so a better understanding of the role of the IVs is possible.  
The duration of operations is expressed in years and tenths, based on the initial start date of the 
HMO or ACO reported in the publicly available data through 12/31/2015. 
Hierarchical condition category risk score.  The HCC risk score is a relatively new 
metric, implemented in 2003, used by Medicare for a variety of purposes.  It consists of several 
elements.  The methodology produces a numeric value that identifies the relative risk associated 
to the factors in the model, i.e., it is an actuarial determination of future utilization.  Its primary 
purpose is payment particularly in Medicare Advantage plans relative to the PMPY amount the 
plans receive to manage care for a beneficiary population. 
The HCC methodology maps the roughly 9,000 existing ICD-10 diagnosis codes in a 
one-to-many relationship to 79 HCCs.  This mapping occurs at the individual beneficiary level 
based on data providers report to Medicare.  Some diagnosis codes have no relevance in the 
HCC risk score.  For instance, the set of ICD-10 diagnosis codes describing disorders of 
metabolism, like diabetes mellitus, may map into multiple HCCs.  If an individual with diabetes 
suffers a fractured finger, the diagnosis code associated to the fracture would not change the 
individual HCC risk score for that beneficiary.   
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Age group, and then gender are the next elements in the HCC methodology.  Age groups 
are <65 years, 65-74 years, 75-79 years, 80-84 years and ≥85 years.  Each age group exists by 
gender in the HCC methodology. 
The HCC methodology also identifies institutional or community residential status by 
beneficiary as well as whether the beneficiary is disabled or in end-stage renal disease status.  
The methodology also includes economic status by changing the HCC risk score if the 
beneficiary was Medicaid eligible during the calculation period. 
While many criticism of the HCC risk scoring methodology exist and it is not perfect, it 
is very useful as a risk-adjustment tool in this analysis.  It considers elements frequently 
recommended in developing a risk-adjustment methodology, namely, age, gender, and 
socioeconomic status.   
CMS reports data on the average HCC risk score at the Medicare Advantage contract 
level.  CMS reports average HCC risk score by beneficiary demographic category for ACOs.  
The Medicare Advantage average is the arithmetic mean.  Because this mean derives from 
individual beneficiary HCC risk scores, and the ACO data reports the arithmetic mean by 
demographic category, it is necessary to weight the ACO HCC average risk scores by 
demographic group.  Using the “mean of the means” in the ACO data would assume the 
contribution of each demographic category average HCC risk score should be the same.  Since 
beneficiary level HCC risk scores are not available in the ACO data, weighting the average HCC 
risk score by ACO beneficiary category is the only way to establish some equivalence between 
the HMO and ACO data.   
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Limitations 
Several limitations are important to note.  First, these data are secondary.  Improper 
laboratory controls, inaccurate Category CPT II code assignment and inaccurate ICD-10 
diagnosis coding may exist.  Second, non-reporting for any beneficiary regarding HbA1c or 
colon cancer screening places that beneficiary in the numerator of the HEDIS or NQF measure 
calculation.  For example, a PCP may have a very well controlled diabetic patient in his/her 
panel.  This patient’s HbA1c may be <8.0%.  However, if on the last patient encounter during the 
period of measurement the patient did not have an HbA1c level done, but should have, that 
patient will be considered out of control.  In other words, missing data for a given beneficiary is 
the same as “fail” on these quality measures.  Third, data on race/ethnicity are patient self-
reported although the data may populate the patient’s record.  Race or ethnicity is not a medical 
issue, per se, and as such virtually all providers simply accept what the patient reports and enter 
that data in the record.  Medicare maintains this data separately as well through its enrollment 
processes.  An individual from Spain, for instance, could identify as Caucasian or Hispanic.   
Limitations exist also regarding the HEDIS and NQF measures as they do not directly 
correlate between the measurement systems.  The HbA1c measure in Medicare HMO includes 
beneficiaries with Type I and Type II diabetes mellitus.  The NQF measure does not include Type 
I diabetes mellitus.  Because the prevalence of Type I diabetes mellitus is 5% or less its existence 
in the HEDIS data for Medicare HMOs should not skew results in a meaningful way. 
The age groups for colon cancer screening are slightly different.  The HEDIS measure 
includes people aged 50-75.  The NQF measure includes people aged 51-75.  This is a small 
difference and does not fundamentally alter the applicability of this analysis.  The importance of 
this measure is the screening process much more so than the age range. 
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Finally, some evidence suggests the structural factors, HMO or ACO, could lead to 
under-reporting of quality measures based on administrative claims data when compared to a 
delivery system using a single electronic health record (Trivedi et al., 2016).  No way exists to 
assess the impact of this dynamic in this research.  
Delimitations 
This effort is an examination of several dependent variables for MSSP ACOs and 
Medicare Advantage HMOs using publicly available data.  Analysis of outcomes based on 
subpopulations in either model are not part of this study.  Medicare Advantage PPO plans are 
likewise not part of this study.  This study focuses on outcomes relative to structure as viewed 
through the SPO framework.  The specific incentives created by the plan type or design are not 
part of this study except by virtue of the fact that incentives are part of structure.  Further study 
into the relationship between incentives, behaviors and outcomes would be meaningful.    
Alternate Methodologies 
With regard to multivariate analysis, discriminant analysis determines which variables 
discriminate between at least two naturally occurring groups.  It is similar to Multiple analysis of 
the variance (MANOVA).  In this case, the research questions are the inverse of a discriminant 
analysis as this study seeks to understand, based on group, differences in quality (Tabachnick, 
2013).  The purpose is not to predict group membership, rather, it is to understand the differences 
between the groups.   
Factor analysis is similar to discriminant analysis in the prediction of group membership.  
However, it also involves identifying variance within the set of DVs.  Using factor analysis 
would help understand the impact of latent and unobserved variables.   
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Multiple analysis of the covariance (MANCOVA) would be very applicable to this study 
with slightly different research questions.  Ample evidence exists regarding the relationships 
between the DVs and age, gender, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status and education.  The 
purpose of this research is not to further quantify those relationships relative to structure.  The 
MANCOVA approach also would not further clarify the role of structure on the DVs.  MANOVA 
would likely be most appropriate in a comparison of a structure using patient-level data, where 
individual covariates would need control.  
Conclusions 
This is a retrospective, non-experimental cohort study seeking to understand differences 
between ACOs and HMOs regarding several outcome measures used similarly between these 
structures.  The analysis will use multiple hierarchical regression with several control variables 
entering the model first.  The IVs of interest will then entire the model in successive steps.  The 
change in beta weights at each step of the model will reveal the contribution of the IV to the 
model.   
The analysis will view structure as the IV.  It will be operationalized through group 
assignment, HMO or ACO, and by size of the beneficiary population served.  This will permit 
detection of how the model and the size of population result in model refinement.   
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Chapter 5:  Results 
 
 
Based on the enumerated differences in structure between Medicare ACOs and HMOs, 
would quality differ between the organization types?  Would the number of beneficiaries served 
impact quality, regardless of plan type?  Of all the measures available between HEDIS and NQF 
for these models, only three measures are similar enough for meaningful comparison:  percent of 
population with diabetes and HbA1c > 9.0%, colon cancer screening rate, and ER visits per 
1,000.  Data analysis occurred using SPSS 24.  This chapter reports the results of the analysis.  
Data Collection 
Data were collected from CMS Public Use Files (PUF) for ACOs and HMOs.  CMS 
publishes these data at different web sites.  The process of creating files with the necessary 
identifiers and variables was different for each organization type due to the format of the data 
published by CMS. 
ACO data.  The web site containing links to the ACO PUFs is:  
https://data.cms.gov/Special-Programs-Initiatives-Medicare-Shared-Savin/Medicare-Shared-
Savings-Program-Accountable-Care-O/x8va-z7cu.  These data were last updated on August 25, 
2016, the date of publication.  The data are available in a database which can be filtered to 
include only certain fields and then exported in a Microsoft Excel format.  Data fields included 
in the dataset and used for this analysis were: 
ACO ID number 
Initial start date 
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Track_1 
Total assigned beneficiaries and total by category in the performance year: 
End-stage renal disease (ESRD) 
Disabled 
Aged/dual eligible 
Aged/non-dual eligible 
Number of beneficiaries by race/ethnic category: 
White 
Black 
Asian 
Hispanic 
Native 
Other 
HCC risk score for 4 categories of beneficiaries in the performance year: 
ESRD 
Disabled 
Aged/dual eligible 
Aged/non-dual eligible 
ER Visits not resulting in inpatient stay 
ACO-19, colorectal cancer screening 
ACO-27, percent of beneficiaries whose HbA1c is in poor control (>9.0%) 
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HMO data.  CMS publishes Medicare Advantage data at the web site:  
https://www.cms.gov/ Research- Statistics -Data-and- Systems/ Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ 
MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/index.html?redirect=/mcradvpartdenroldata.  Several discrete files are 
needed to build a database containing the relevant information for this analysis: 
1. Monthly enrollment by plan 
2. MA HEDIS public use files 
3. MA plan directory 
A different web site contains the plan payment data where HCC risk score by plan is 
published:  https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Advantage/Plan-Payment/Plan-Payment-
Data.html 
All the above files were downloaded and then opened in Microsoft Excel as the CMS 
Medicare Advantage data web sites are not interactive like the ACO web site.  Using a series of 
lookups based on the Contract ID number, a new dataset was created containing the following 
information: 
1. Contracts identified with an ID number HXXXX, and plan type = HMO, indicating the 
contract is an HMO 
2. Contract enrollment, including Part D, as of December 2015.  This was verified using the 
MA plan payment data using the plan type for HMO. 
3. Average Part C risk score, which is the contract level HCC risk score. 
4. HEDIS measure results: 
a. EOC020-0040, percent of population with HbA1c > 9.0% 
b. UOS528-0020, ER visits per 1,000 with no inpatient admission 
c. Race/Ethnicity data: 
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i. PD1808-1160, percent of white beneficiaries 
ii. PD1808-1210, percent of black beneficiaries 
iii. PD1808-1310, percent of Asian beneficiaries 
iv. PD1808-1360, percent of native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islanders 
v. PD1808-1570, percent of Hispanic beneficiaries 
vi. PD1808-1410, percent of some other race 
vii. PD1808-1230, percent of Native beneficiaries 
d. EOC040-0010, reported rate of colorectal cancer screening 
 
Data Concatenation 
Using Microsoft Excel, the following specifies the steps needed to concatenate the data 
sets to create a research database suitable for use in SPSS 24: 
1. Create a dummy variable for cohort and assigned ACO=0, HMO=1 
2. Calculate the weighted average HCC risk score in each ACO by computing the percent of 
total assigned beneficiaries in each category in the performance year and multiplying by 
the HCC risk score for that category of beneficiaries.  The sum of these products is the 
weighted average HCC risk score for the ACO. 
3. Calculate the percent of ACO and HMO beneficiaries who are Caucasian and the percent 
non-Caucasian to create two new dummy variables, percent White and percent not-White. 
4. Using the ACO and HMO Contract start dates, calculate operating years to the nearest 
tenth using an end date of December 31, 2015. 
The resulting database includes the following fields: 
1. ID:  the ACO ID or HMO Contract ID numbers 
2. Cohort:  HMO=0, ACO=1 
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3. Population 
4. HbA1c:  beneficiaries with diabetes per the NQF or HEDIS measure, with last 
HbA1c>9.0%. 
5. ColonCA:  percent of beneficiaries screened for colon cancer per the NQF and HEDIS 
measures. 
6. ER Visits:  ER visits per 1,000 beneficiaries not resulting in inpatient admission. 
7. HCC Score:  average HCC risk score. 
8. Operating Years:  years and tenths of years calculated using the start date of the plan and 
ending December 31, 2015. 
Data Cleaning and Preparation 
In order to use the research dataset, missing values and univariate outliers needed 
identification as the existence of either can distort the analysis (Tabachnick, 2013).  Missing 
values were missing at random, indicated by Little’s MCAR (χ2 = 14.142, df=25, p=.439). 
Identification of univariate outliers occurred by examining Z scores for values > 3.29.  A 
case is an outlier if is deviates from the mean by +/- three standard deviations (Tabachnick, 
2013).  Of the 619 cases in the data, 28 cases were outliers on one or more of the variables 
leaving cases in the dataset for analysis.  Because deleting outliers did not compromise power, 
these 28 cases were deleted.   
Three cases had missing values for at least one data element.  Deleting these cases, 
without replacement, further reduces the total sample to 588 cases with 15,777,561 beneficiaries.  
Because deleting these cases does not materially reduce power, they were also deleted. 
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Study Variable Intercorrelations 
Bivariate correlation analysis identified relationships between variables.  None of the 
correlations were above tolerance of the Pearson product-moment correlation (r > .70) although 
several correlations were significant at p<.01 in the two-tailed analysis.  Most interesting were 
the negative correlations between operating years and ER visits per 1,000 (-.557) and between 
colon cancer screening and HbA1c > 9.0% (-.533).  Table 6 presents these results. 
Table 6:  Correlations Between Study Variables 
 % Not 
White 
Avg. HCC HbA1c ColonCA ER Visits Population Operating 
Years 
% not-White  .207** .182** .020 -.075 .072 .293** 
Avg. HCC   .157** -.001 .148** .125** .343** 
HbA1c    -.533** .283** -.139* -.036 
ColonCA     -.461** .272** .338** 
ER Visits      -.305** -.557** 
Population       .452** 
Operating Years        
*p<.05, **p<.01. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 7 contains the descriptive statistics for each variable. 
Table 7:  Descriptive Statistics 
 HbA1c ColonCA ER Visits HCC Score not-White Population Years 
Range .96 .71 1,171.44 1.03 .98 326,257.00 29.61 
Minimum .04 .21 192.45 .68 .02 513.00 1.00 
Maximum 1.00 .92 1,364.00 1.70 1.00 326,770.00 30.60 
Mean .20 .64 639.45 1.07 .26 27,109.21 7.20 
Std. Dev. .09 .12 222.16 .15 .27 31,613.23 7.90 
Skewness 2.95 -.54 .36 1.07 1.61 3.46 1.51 
Kurtosis 18.27 .14 .05 1.82 1.69 19.13 1.19 
 
In sample sizes greater than 300 the standard errors of skewness or kurtosis may cause 
Type 1 error for the Z-test of the null hypothesis (Hae-Young Kim, 2013).  The Z-scores for the 
kurtosis statistic exceeded 1.96 except for colon cancer screening rate and ER visits per 1,000.  
 64 
 
The Z-scores associated to skewness exceed +/- 1.96 for each variable.  Visualization of the 
histograms and the absolute values of skewness, for values >2, and kurtosis, for values >7, 
should guide decisions about variable transformation in large sample sizes (Hae-Young Kim, 
2013).   
A case could be reasonably made to use these variables without transformation.  
However, the decision should take the assumptions of multiple regression into account.  If the 
natural state of these variables should cause heterogeneity of residual variance or 
heteroscedasticity, then transformation would be appropriate.    
Assumptions of Multiple Regression 
Multiple regression relies on several important assumptions.  The ratio of cases to IVs 
exceeds the minimum recommendation of twenty (Tabachnick, 2013).  The data should 
demonstrate linearity, with homogeneity of variance and homoscedasticity.  These are assessed 
through visualization of histograms, P-P plots and scatterplots of residual versus predicted 
values.  While multiple regression is robust to violations of normality, assessment of the data and 
residuals as normal or near-normal strengthens the interpretation of results (Tabachnick, 2013).  
Because this analysis tests the relationship between organization type and population size on 
three separate DVs, assessment and reporting of these assumptions will occur in the discussion 
of each model. 
Data transformation.  In each model, however, the assessment of violations of these 
assumptions revealed obvious deviations from normality using un-transformed variables.  As a 
result, the multiple regression procedure occurred using the natural log transformation of all 
continuous variables.  The unstandardized beta weights of the un-transformed variables reflected 
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the same relationships as those found using the transformed variables reported in the data 
analysis. 
Multivariate outliers.  Multivariate outliers were assessed as part of a separate 
regression procedure.  In this procedure the dummy variable for cohort served as the DV with all 
the study CVs and DVs, along with the IV for population, input in one step.  The Mahalanobis 
distance statistics indicated the presence of multivariate outliers.  However, the maximum 
Cook’s Distance values were less than 0.5, indicating these values were low leverage and 
distance, and removing them from the models would not materially alter results.  The existence 
of multivariate outliers with low leverage and distance characteristics suggest caution 
interpreting results but does not invalidate the use of those variables (Tabachnick, 2013).  To 
remove uncertainty, however, Mahalanobis distance values with p<.01 were identified.  Six cases 
had p<.01 and were deleted resulting in 582 cases in the dataset for analysis.   
Multivariate collinearity was assessed as part of the regression procedure.  Eigenvalues 
ranged from .001 to .900.  Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were only >2 for two variables and 
those values were less <3 (ER visits and operating years).  The condition index was <30 for all 
variables except colon cancer screening at 36.21.   
While multivariate outliers were present and some collinearity exists, these conditions are 
not surprising based on the nature of the data.  The assessment of linearity, homogeneity of 
variance and homoscedasticity using transformed variables, showed in each model normal or 
near-normal conditions such that continuation of the analysis was appropriate (Tabachnick, 
2013). 
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Data Analysis 
 The following describes the results of the multiple hierarchical regression models 
testing the previously stated hypothesis concerning HbA1c, colon cancer screening and ER 
utilization based on organization type and population size.  To avoid confusion in the 
interpretation of the sign of beta weights for each DV based on the IVs, specific identification of 
these relationships occurs coincident with the reported results on each DV.   
Model one:  organization type.  Multiple hierarchical regression was used to determine 
whether a relationship exists between the type of organization, ACO or HMO, and the DVs 
previously described.  The dummy variable created for cohort identified HMO=0 and ACO=1.   
The IVs and CVs were transformed using the natural log as previously discussed.   
Percent population with HbA1c > 9.0%.  The research question is:  do Medicare ACOs 
have a greater percent of population with diabetes mellitus and most recent HbA1c > 9.0% than 
HMOs, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years of operations? 
The model was significant, F(1,571) =24.524, p=.000, adjusted R2 = .141.  The R2 change 
at the fourth step in the model was .015.  Table 8 reports the regression coefficients and standard 
errors: 
Table 8:  Multiple Hierarchical Regression of HbA1c Based on Cohort 
 Β Standard Error t Significance 
Log not-White .109 .018 6.069 .000 
Log HCC .559 .118 4.728 .000 
Log Years -.149 .037 -4.891 .000 
Cohort -.215 .061 -3.208 .001 
 
These results indicate that a higher percentage of not-White patients would have a higher 
percentage of diabetic patients with the most recent HbA1c > 9.0%.  A higher average HCC risk 
score would indicate the same finding.  A longer duration of operations would associate to a 
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lower percentage of diabetic patients with last HbA1c > 9.0%.  After accounting for the variation 
on these CVs, being in the ACO cohort would associate to a lower percentage of patients with 
last HbA1c > 9.0%. 
The histogram reflects some kurtosis but appears near-normal.  The P-P plot of 
standardized residuals show small deviation from the diagonal line of identity.  
The scatterplot of residual v. predicted values demonstrates sufficient homoscedasticity. 
Figure 4 is the histogram of the log transformed HbA1c > 9.0% 
 
Figure 4:  Histogram of Log Transformed HbA1c > 9.0% 
Figure 5 is the P-P plot of standardized residuals. 
 
Figure 5:  P-P Plot of Standardized Residuals 
Figure 6 is the scatterplot of standardized residual v. predicted values. 
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Figure 6:  Scatterplot of Residual v. Predicted Values 
Percent population screened for colon cancer.  The research question is:  do Medicare 
ACOs have a greater percent of population screened for colon cancer than HMOs, controlling for 
race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years of operations? 
The model was significant, F(1,571) = 38.95, p=.000, adjusted R2=.206.  The R2 change 
at the fourth step in the model was .000.  Table 9 reports the regression coefficients and standard 
errors. 
Table 9:  Multiple Hierarchical Regression of Colon Cancer Screening Based on Cohort 
Variable B Standard Error t Significance 
Log not-White -.038 .009 -4.201 .000 
Log HCC Risk Score -.220 .059 -3.699 .000 
Log Operating Years .102 .015 6.642 .000 
Cohort -.003 .034 -.083 .934 
 
A larger percentage of not-White beneficiaries and a higher average HCC risk score 
would associate to a lower colon cancer screening rate.  A longer duration of operations would 
also associate to a higher screening rate.  However, after the CVs, the cohort identification did 
not return a significant result and as such is an equivocal finding.  
The histogram continues to reflect some kurtosis and perhaps negative skew but appears 
near-normal.  The P-P plot of standardized residuals show small deviation from the diagonal line 
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of identity but are near-normal.  The scatterplot of residual v. predicted values demonstrates 
sufficient homoscedasticity, although there is some visual evidence of multicollinearity.  Figure 7 
is the histogram of the log transformed colon cancer screening rate. 
 
Figure 7:  Histogram of Log Transformed Colon Cancer Screening Rate 
Figure 8 is the P-P plot of the standardized residuals. 
A higher percentage of not-White beneficiaries and a higher HCC risk score would 
indicate a greater number of ER visits per 1,000 
 
Figure 8:  P-P Plot of Standardized Residual 
Figure 9 is the scatterplot of standardized residual v. predicted values. 
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Figure 9:  Scatterplot of Residual v. Predicted Values 
ER utilization based on cohort.  The model was significant, F(1,571) = 11.376, p=.000, 
adjusted R2=.559.  The R2 change at the fourth step in the model was .044.  Table 10 reports the 
regression coefficients and standard errors. 
Table 10:  Multiple Hierarchical Regression of ER Visits per 1,000Bbased on Cohort 
Variable B Standard Error t Significance 
Log Not-White .052 .012 4.186 .000 
Log HCC Risk Score 1.037 .082 12.702 .000 
Log Operating Years -.145 .021 -6.893 .000 
Cohort .350 .046 7.591 .000 
 
A longer duration of operations would indicate lower ER utilization.  After the CVs, the 
identification of cohort with a positive beta weight indicates higher ER utilization in the ACOs.   
 The histogram continues to reflect some kurtosis but appears near-normal.  The P-P plot 
of standardized residuals show small deviation from the diagonal line of identity but are near-
normal.  The scatterplot of residual v. predicted values demonstrates sufficient homoscedasticity.  
Figure 10 is the histogram of the log transformed ER visits per 1,000. 
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Figure 10:  Histogram of Log Transformed ER Visits per 1,000 
Figure 11 is the P-P plot of standardized residuals. 
 
Figure 11:  P-P Plot of Standardized Residual 
Figure 12 is the scatterplot of standardized residual v. predicted values. 
 
Figure 12:  Scatterplot of Residual v. Predicted Values 
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Model two:  population size.  This model views the IV associated to structure through 
the perspective of the number of beneficiaries served by the plans to examine the effect on the 
DVs.   
Population with HbA1c > 9.0%.  The research question is:  do ACOs and HMOs serving 
larger beneficiary populations have fewer patients with diabetes mellitus and most recent  
HbA1c>9.0%, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years of 
operations? 
The model was significant, F(1,571) = 7.271, p=.000, adjusted R2=.15.  The R2 change at 
the fourth step in the model was .029. Table 11 reports regression coefficients and standard 
errors. 
Table 11:   Multiple Hierarchical Regression of HbA1c Based on Population 
Variable B Standard Error t Significance 
Log Not-White .123 .017 7.301 .000 
Log HCC Risk Score .505 .117 4.301 .000 
Log Operating Years -.035 .018 -1.944 .052 
Population -.083 .019 -4.454 .000 
 
A higher percentage of not-White patients and higher HCC risk score would indicate a 
higher percentage of diabetic patients with most recent HbA1c > 9.0%.  This is consistent with 
the results of the cohort analysis.  The negative beta weight associated to duration of operations 
indicates newer plans have a greater proportion of diabetic patients with last HbA1c > 9.0%.  
This result approached significance but was not conclusive.  After the CVs are taken into 
account, this model indicates a larger population of beneficiaries would have a lower percentage 
of diabetic patients with last HbA1c > 9.0%, regardless of plan type. 
The histogram continues to reflect some kurtosis but appears near-normal.  The P-P plot 
of standardized residuals show small deviation from the diagonal line of identity but are near-
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normal.  The scatterplot of residual v. predicted values demonstrates sufficient homoscedasticity.  
Figure 13 is the histogram of the log transformed HbA1c > 9.0%. 
 
Figure 13:  Histogram of Log Transformed HbA1c > 9.0% 
Figure 14 is the P-P plot of standardized residuals. 
 
Figure 14:  P-P Plot of Standardized Residual 
Figure 15 is the scatterplot of standardized residual v. predicted values. 
 
Figure 15:  Scatterplot of Residual v. Predicted Values 
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Percent population screened for colon cancer.  The research question is:  Do ACOs and 
HMOs serving larger beneficiary populations have more patients screened for colon cancer, 
controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years of operations? 
The model was significant, F(1,571) = 43.174, p=.000, adjusted R2=.227.  The R2 change 
at the fourth step in the model was .020.  Table 12 reports regression coefficients and standard 
errors. 
Table 12:  Multiple Hierarchical Regression of Colon Cancer Screening Based on Population 
Variable B Standard Error t Significance 
Log Not-White -.036 .008 -4.279 .000 
Log HCC Risk Score -.206 .059 -3.512 .000 
Log Operating Years .089 .009 9.907 .000 
Population .036 .009 3.886 .000 
 
Having more not-White beneficiaries and a higher HCC risk score would indicate a lower 
colon cancer screening rate in the population.  A longer duration of operations associates to a 
higher screening rate.  This is consistent with the findings in the cohort model.  The IV for 
population size, indicates a larger population would associate to a higher screening rate after 
controls.  Where the finding on in the cohort analysis for this DV was not significant, this finding 
is significant. 
The histogram continues to reflect some kurtosis and perhaps negative skew but appears 
near-normal.  The P-P plot of standardized residuals show small deviation from the diagonal line 
of identity but are near-normal.  The scatterplot of residual v. predicted values demonstrates 
sufficient homoscedasticity, although there is some visual evidence of multicollinearity.  Figure 
16 is the histogram of the log transformed colon cancer screening rate. 
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 ER utilization per 1,000.  The model was significant, F(1,571) = 158.526, p=.000, 
adjusted R2=.523.  The R2 change at the fourth step in the model was .009.  Table 13 reports 
regression coefficient and standard errors. 
Table 13:  Multiple hierarchical regression of ER visits per 1,000 based on population 
Variable B Standard Error t Significance 
Log Not-White .021 .012 1.694 .091 
Log HCC Risk Score 1.056 .085 12.445 .000 
Log Operating Years -.263 .013 -20.225 .000 
Population -.044 .013 -3.245 .001 
 
A higher percentage of not-White beneficiaries and a higher HCC risk score would 
indicate more ER visits per 1,000.  A longer duration of operations would indicate lower ER 
utilization.  These results are consistent with the cohort model.  This result also indicates that a 
larger population of beneficiaries served would have fewer ER visits per 1,000, after controls. 
The histogram continues to reflect some kurtosis but appears near-normal.  The P-P plot 
of standardized residuals show small deviation from the diagonal line of identity but are near-
normal.  The scatterplot of residual v. predicted values demonstrates sufficient homoscedasticity. 
Figure 16 is the histogram of the log transformed colon cancer screening rate. 
 
Figure 16:  Histogram of Log Transformed Colon Cancer Screening Rate 
 
 76 
 
Figure 17 is the P-P plot of standardized residuals. 
 
Figure 17:  P-P plot of standardized residual 
Figure 18 is the scatterplot of standardized residual v. predicted values.   
 
Figure 18:  Scatterplot of residual v. predicted values 
 
 Figure 19 is the histogram of the log transformed ER visits per 1,000. 
 
Figure 19:  Histogram of Log Transformed ER Visits per 1,000 
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Figure 20 is the P-P plot of standardized residuals. 
 
Figure 20:  P-P Plot of Standardized Residuals 
Figure 21 is the scatterplot of standardized residual v. predicted values. 
 
Figure 21:  Scatterplot of Residual v. Predicted Values 
Summary of Findings 
Findings associated to each hypothesis are summarized in Table 14. 
Table 14:  Summary of Findings 
Hypothesis Supported 
H1:  Medicare ACOs have fewer beneficiaries with last HbA1c > 9.0% 
 
Yes 
H2:  Medicare ACOs screen more age-appropriate patients for colon cancer 
 
No 
H3:  Medicare HMOs have fewer ER visits per 1,000 not resulting in hospital admission 
 
Yes 
H4:  Organizations serving larger populations will have fewer diabetic patients with last 
HbA1c > 9.0% 
 
Yes 
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Table 14:  Continued 
Hypothesis Supported 
H5:  Organizations serving larger populations will have a higher rate of colon cancer 
screening 
 
Yes 
H6:  Organizations serving larger populations will have fewer ER visits per 1,000 not 
resulting in hospital admission   
 
Yes 
  
 Hypothesis 1.  Findings indicate ACOs have a smaller population of diabetic patients with 
last HbA1c > 9.0% (β = -.215, p<.001).  Cohort accounted for 1.5% of the regression model.  
These results supported hypothesis one. 
 Hypothesis 2.  Findings are equivocal as to whether ACOs screen more age-appropriate 
patients for colon cancer (β=-.003, p=.934).  Cohort accounted for 0% of the regression 
model.  The results did not support hypothesis two. 
 Hypothesis 3:   Findings indicate HMOs have lower ER visits per 1,000 not resulting in 
hospital admission (β=.350, p<.001).  Cohort accounted for 4.4% of the regression model.  
The results support hypothesis three.  
 Hypothesis 4:  Findings indicate the larger the population served, the lower the percentage of 
diabetic population with last HbA1c > 9.0% (β=-.083, p<.01).  Population size accounted for 
2.9% of the regression model.  The results support hypothesis four. 
 Hypothesis 5.  Findings indicate serving a larger population associated to a higher age-
appropriate colon cancer screening rate (β=.036, p<.01).  Population accounted for 2.0% of 
the model.  The results support hypothesis five. 
 Hypothesis 6:  Findings indicate serving a larger population associated to lower ER visits per 
1,000 not resulting in hospital admission (β=-.044, p=.001).  Population accounted for .09% 
of the regression model.  The results support hypothesis six. 
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Conclusions 
On balance, the control variables explained a significant amount of variation in both 
models for each DV.  The R2 change in each model where the IV entered the equations were 
uniformly small, the largest being .350 when analyzing ER visits based on cohort.  Only one 
finding, for hypothesis two, was not significant.  The unstandardized beta weights associated to 
the transformed values of the variables require caution in their interpretation as the percentage 
change in a log value will not equal the percentage change on the variable prior to 
transformation.  However, the consistency of the direction of the beta weights for the control 
variables gives some indication that the demographics of the population served are meaningful in 
terms of quality measures.   
  
 80 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6:  Discussion 
 
 
This research examined the role of structure relative to outcome using the Donabedian 
quality framework.  It was retrospective, non-experimental, and used publicly available data to 
evaluate quality based on two operational definitions of structure. 
This chapter summarizes the introduction, conceptual framework, literature review and 
methods.  It reviews results and offers interpretation of their implications.  Thoughts regarding 
additional lines of inquiry are also identified as well as limitations and delimitations.   
Introduction 
The introduction provided background regarding the ongoing national conversation and 
debate about healthcare reform.  Despite the per capita spend in the US being twice as high as 
other first-world countries, the health status of the US population is arguably worse than some 
third-world countries.  The US has shorter life expectancy, more infant mortality, more obesity 
and a greater chronic disease burden than other countries spending far less.  The inexorable year-
over-year increase in the NHE, now estimated at $3.3 trillion each year, and increasing, might be 
justified if the return matched the investment (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS), HHS, August, 2016; Fuchs, 2010).  At nearly 17% of the GDP, however, the focus on 
quality in conjunction with decreasing at least the rate of NHE increase has profound 
implications on the US economy. 
These conversations about reform, cost, access and even quality are not new.  The idea of 
creating a social health insurance program no doubt came up before the Truman administration 
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but it was during that time the idea began to gain traction.  It culminated with the creation of 
Medicare Part A in 1965.  Cost pressures in the Medicare program are building as trust fund 
insolvency looms in the not-too-distant future while 10,000 baby boomers each day age into 
eligibility.  Medicare has ample experience developing programmatic approaches to improving 
quality and managing cost, e.g., DRGs, Part B fee schedule.  Today, Medicare spending 
consumes 20% of the NHE.   
One of the most significant programs developed was Medicare managed care.  Initially 
called “Part C” and now called “Medicare Advantage,” today nearly 20 million beneficiaries 
receive care through the program.  Nearly 64% of Medicare Advantage plans are HMOs, most of 
them offered by health insurance companies like:  United Healthcare, Anthem, Humana and 
Cigna.  Roughly 30% of Medicare Advantage plans are “provider sponsored” meaning the plan 
is part of an umbrella organization that includes providers.  The majority of plans use contracted 
networks to deliver care.  These plans bid risk contracts to Medicare in specific geographies.  
The HMOs in turn pass financial risk to their provider networks, which are typically narrowly 
constituted.  
With the implementation of PPACA, Medicare created a novel structure, the ACO.  The 
most common form is the MSSP Track 1 ACO.  In 2016, 91% of MSSP ACOs were in Track 1, 
which do not bear direct financial risk.  Medicare reported the composition of MSSP ACOs to be 
56% organized as networks of individual practices (IPAs), 36% as group practices and 38% as 
hospital/professional partnerships (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 
2017a).   
While similarities exist between ACOs and HMOs, there are profound differences.  These 
differences are structural responses to incentives created by Medicare.  The ACOs and HMOs 
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then create incentives for the providers.  The alignment or diffusion of these incentives varies 
with structure.   
Conceptual Framework 
Donabedian offered the Structure-Process-Outcome (SPO) model to aid in a more 
complete understanding of quality, coincidentally right after Medicare came into existence (A. 
Donabedian, 1966).  The SPO framework identifies structure as resources, resource allocation, 
location, funding and organization.  Process describes technical and interpersonal skill.  The 
framework is hierarchical building from structure through process to outcome.  But, as a 
common definition of “quality” is still elusive, the SPO framework suggests that the result 
achieved is only part of “quality.”   
Taken together, the differences in beneficiary participation, provider participation, the 
ability of HMOs to modify benefits, and the differences in payment and reporting, support an 
operational definition of HMOs and ACOs as different structures.  The differences in funding 
and organization yield varying incentives which may shift priority between quality and cost 
based on structure. 
Because structure also refers to the quantity, allocation and location of resources, a 
second operational definition of structure measures by the size of the beneficiary population 
served is also tested.  As the size of the beneficiary population increases the number of resources 
needed to provide care must also increase. 
Literature Review 
The literature is not abundantly populated with comparisons of quality between 
structures.  However, the SPO is often used in quality research (Ayanian & Markel, 2016).  
Previous research explored differences between Medicare FFS and HMOs using variables like 
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the SF-36.  Other studies examined differences between for-profit and not-for-profit Medicare 
HMOs.  One approach involved comparing quality in the VA Health System and Medicare 
Advantage, essentially using the Health Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) 
measures (Trivedi & Grebla, 2011).  This study is important because it identified differences in 
quality and because the composition of ACOs more closely aligns to integrated delivery systems 
(IDS), like the VA Health System, than does the ownership of HMOs.   
Methods 
The research questions explored the impact of structure on outcome.  The research 
questions were: 
1. Do Medicare ACOs have a greater percent of population with diabetes mellitus and most 
recent HbA1c > 9.0% than HMOs, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and 
plan years of operations?  
2.  Do Medicare ACOs have a greater percent of population screened for colon cancer than 
HMOs, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years of operations?  
3. Do Medicare ACOs have lower ER utilization per 1,000 not resulting in hospital 
admission than HMOs, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years 
of operations?  
4. Do ACOs and HMOs serving larger beneficiary populations have fewer patients with 
diabetes mellitus and most recent HbA1c>9.0%, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC 
risk score and plan years of operations?  
5. Do ACOs and HMOs serving larger beneficiary populations have more patients screened 
for colon cancer, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk score and plan years of 
operations?  
 84 
 
6. Do ACOs and HMOs serving larger beneficiary populations have fewer ER visits per 
1,000 not resulting in hospital admission, controlling for race/ethnicity, average HCC risk 
score and plan years of operations?  
The data were contained in Public Use Files (PUF) and existed in multiple disparate databases.  
The HMO plans use HEDIS to report quality performance.  The ACO plans use the National 
Quality Foundation (NQF) measures.  The three measures have minor differences in the level of 
measurement but were essentially congruent.  These measures were the dependent variables.  
They were:  the percent of population with diabetes mellitus and last HbA1c > 9.0%, colon 
cancer screening rate and ER visits per 1,000 not resulting in hospital admission.      
The hypotheses were as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1:  Medicare ACOs have fewer diabetic patients with last HbA1c > 9.0%  
 Hypothesis 2:  Medicare ACOs screen more age-appropriate patients for colon cancer.  
 Hypothesis 3:  Medicare HMOs have fewer ER visits per 1,000 not resulting in hospital 
admission. 
 Hypothesis 4:  Organizations serving larger populations will have fewer diabetic patients 
with last HbA1c > 9.0%  
 Hypothesis 5:  Organizations serving larger populations will have a higher rate of colon 
cancer screening.  
 Hypothesis 6:  Organizations serving larger populations will have fewer ER visits per 1,000 
not resulting in hospital admission.  
The sample power derived from the number of beneficiaries included.  The sampling 
frame included 609 HMOs and ACOs serving 17,898,330 beneficiaries.  The analysis used 
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multiple hierarchical regression.  As the data were publicly available with no beneficiary 
identifiers, this was not a human subjects study. 
Risk adjustment occurred through the use of several control variables (CV).  The CVs 
were the percent of population not-White, plan level average Hierarchical Condition Category 
(HCC) risk score and duration of operations through December 31, 2015.   
The data were explored and cleaned.  Univariate outliers were identified using Z-scores.  
Multivariate outliers were identified by the Mahalanobis distance.  This resulted in the deletion 
of 28 cases.  Three additional cases were deleted due to missing data which was determined to be 
missing at random using Little’s MCAR.   Positive skew and kurtosis were corrected using the 
natural log transformation of continuous variables.   
The cohort model used a dummy variable, with HMO = 0 and ACO = 1 as the 
independent variable (IV).  The CVs entered the equation in three steps in the order of the 
percent not-White, HCC risk score and duration of operations.  The DVs were the percent with 
last HbA1c > 9.0%, colon cancer screening rate and ER visits per 1,000. 
The population model used a continuous independent variable which was the size of the 
beneficiary population for each plan.  The CVs were entered in three steps as above.  The DVs 
were the same as the cohort model 
Results  
The beta weights associated to the DVs in both models are summarized in Table 15.  The 
results of the cohort model perhaps illuminate how aligned the incentives created in each 
program really are.  The ACOs had fewer beneficiaries with diabetes and elevated blood sugar, 
after controls.  There was no difference between ACOs and HMOs in the rate of colon cancer 
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Table 15:  Summary of Beta Weights for Each Variable 
 Cohort Population 
 HbA1c ColonCA ER Visits HbA1c ColonCA ER Visits 
Not-White .109 -.038 .052 .123 -.036 .021 
HCC Score .559 -.220 1.037 .505 -.206 1.056 
Operating Years -.149 .102 -.145 -.145 .089 -.263 
Cohort -.215 -.003* .350    
Population    -.083 .036 -.044 
*p>.05 
screening, after controls.  HMOs had fewer ER visits per 1,000 than ACOs, after controls.  The 
results support the hypothesized relationships except for the colon cancer screening rate. 
The results of the population model support all three hypotheses.  As the organization 
increases in size to serve more beneficiaries, performance on the quality measures improves.  
These findings are in keeping with a common approach in value-based purchasing (VBP) of 
enrolling subscribers at some scale.  The idea of spreading the risk of fewer high-risk patients 
over a larger population of lower risk patients is a commonly employed strategy. 
Discussion       
Cohort model.  Consider two individuals with Type II diabetes.  One beneficiary has an 
HbA1c of 8.9%, the other has HbA1c at 9.1%.  In terms of how well controlled a physician 
might consider their disease, this difference is negligible.  We might prefer the lower number, but 
in reality, a practitioner might not view these numbers very differently.  In terms of utilization, 
there is not likely to be significant variance based on the minor difference in blood sugar level.  
Because any HbA1c reading is a “snapshot” of three months, we might counsel the person at 
9.1% to make some minor changes and re-check in three months.  In fact, that is likely to be the 
exact approach for the individual at 8.9%. 
If the beneficiary with their most recent HbA1c at 9.1% is in an ACO, then the ACO fails 
that measure for that beneficiary.  If enough of these exist in the attributed population, then the 
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ACO does not qualify to share savings no matter how much it might actually save.  If this is an 
HMO enrollee, then an opportunity for a quality incentive through the Stars Rating might not 
exist.  But, all things being equal, the HMO is taking financial risk and passing that on to its 
provider network so no financial penalty results from this last HbA1c level.  If the ACO alters its 
utilization pattern in managing this beneficiary to reduce cost but has this HbA1c result, the 
reduced utilization does not yield a shared savings and the ACO providers forego the FFS 
payment for services they might otherwise receive.  If the HMO changes its utilization pattern, 
and gets the same HbA1c result, then it presumably generates profit but may not get the Stars 
Rating incentive.  The priority of meeting quality measures and financial implications results in a 
decidedly mixed incentive in comparing these structures. 
The results on colon cancer screening did not differentiate based on the IV for structure in 
cohort model.  The incentives to screen and detect are difficult to identify.  Prevention activities 
have a cost.  The temporal relationship between the cost and realizing the financial benefit of 
preventing that disease exists over a period of years.  During that interval, the beneficiary may 
change plans meaning the benefit of the investment in prevention might accrue to another ACO 
or HMO.  Colonoscopy, still the gold standard, is at best difficult for patients and more expensive 
than other tests.  Patients prefer other less invasive and lower cost methods of screening while 
physicians prefer colonoscopy (Hawley, Lillie, Cooper, & Elston Lafata, 2014).  Even though 
individuals aged 66 and older get screened at a higher rate than individuals aged 50-65, the 
screening rate in the 66 plus age group was only 66% in 2015 (American Cancer Society, 2017).  
Chronic disease and utilization measures are more “now,” where prevention is more “later.”  Said 
differently, if a patient does not accept a recommendation for screening colonoscopy this year, 
the same recommendation will likely be offered next year.  This may be contributing to 
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performance as the priority for this screening may take lower priority than others (Coronado, 
Petrik, Bartelmann, Coyner, & Coury, 2015).    
 The preventable deaths and possible savings associated to better screening and detection 
are compelling.  As less invasive, lower cost and higher sensitivity test options become available, 
e.g., Cologuard, the incentives for ACOs and HMOs, physicians and patients might align better 
to increase colon cancer screening rates.  Other forms of cancer screening are easier to 
accomplish, e.g., mammography, and additional research may find better success on other 
screening measures in both structures. 
The findings on ER visits per 1,000 are in keeping with prior research identifying the 
ability of HMOs to manage utilization.  When primary care practitioners take financial risk, 
preventing avoidable ER visits results in financial benefit.  In the ACO program, as the 
proportion of evaluation and management services rendered by primary care physicians 
increases, so does the ER utilization (Herrel, Ayanian, Hawken, & Miller, 2017).  Medicare 
Advantage plans have lower ER utilization than fee-for-service Medicare (B. E. Landon et al., 
2012).  This dynamic is a result of the financial incentives created through these programs.      
 Population model.  Dr. Atul Gawande, a well-known physician and author, opined as to 
the benefits of scale, i.e., structure, with regard to process, saying, “As that [moving more risk to 
providers] emerges…it seems to me that bigger organizations are in a better position to take on 
that risk” (Berenson, 2014).  Dr. Gawande’s point directly address the idea of spreading the 
fewer numbers of high risk patients across a larger population of low risk patients.  As more 
value-based arrangements come into existence, consolidation will continue to occur particularly 
for provider organizations.  This is already occurring with pace as it seems VBP is in many ways 
a euphemism for shifting financial risk from insurers to providers (Lineen, 2014).   
 89 
 
The results of population model may also indicate the leveraging of structure in 
replicating processes at scale.  Dr. Gawande referred to this as “big medicine” (Gawande, 2012).  
As the size of the beneficiary population increases, the structure to support it may provide greater 
opportunity to reduce variation through the use of informatics and systems with a heightened 
focus on execution (Berenson, 2014).  The medical expense budgets increase with the size of the 
population, meaning more dollars are at-risk when the ACO or HMO is larger.  The relationship 
between mass and risk relative to quality is an important area for future research. 
Control variables.  The control variables held great importance in both models, yielding 
consistent results across models for all three DVs.  This indicates a high degree of stability and 
strengthens the interpretation of these results.  More not-White beneficiaries and higher average 
HCC risk scores meant poorer performance on the quality measures.  Also in keeping with the 
literature, the findings on duration of operations indicates the longer the plans exist the better 
their performance on these quality measures.   
Limitations and Delimitations 
The primary limitation of this research is publicly available data are designed for 
administrative purposes, not research.  These data are highly diverse in taxonomy, format and 
content.  This diversity may be preventing robust analysis of this kind.  This is an issue going all 
these programs would make the analysis of results much easier. 
The purpose of this study did not include an assessment of costs.  Drawing inferences 
about cost based on the ER utilization measure is reasonable but far from certain or definitive.  
Incorporating cost into future research would be valuable.  The specific incentives created 
through the structures embodied by HMOs and ACOs are not part of this effort.  Medicare PPO 
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plans were not included.  Analysis at the sub-population would be an important future area of 
research but was not part of this study.  
  Conclusion 
The results of this research suggest logical steps for future research.  A comparison of 
outcomes over time at the beneficiary level between a small group of HMOs and ACOs would be 
meaningful.  Exploration of whether favorable selection is occurring in ACOs, and perhaps 
occurring less in HMOs, would likewise be informative.  Replicating these results with calendar 
year 2016 data would add value to our understanding of the quality of care in these programs.  In 
any of these approaches, more refined risk adjustment would increase applicability.  A study 
further exploring the economic incentives created by Medicare, actualized by the plans and 
realized by the providers would also be an important next step.  Further research into the 
relationship between the mass of the plan or organization, in terms of covered lives, and quality, 
cost or access results would add to our understanding of VBP programs and their effectiveness.     
 This research fills an important role in developing a better understanding of the quality, 
measured by HEDIS or NQF, of the ACO and HMO programs.  The relevance of this research is 
in demonstrating that differences do exist between ACOs and HMOs with regard to performance 
on quality measures.  The results by size of the population served are also relevant in that they 
may be added confirmation of a common approach in VBP driving provider consolidations and 
mergers. 
Healthcare financing models create incentives through the payment and quality programs 
they design.  Healthcare provider systems develop structures to maximize their incentive 
opportunities relative to payment or quality.  These organizational structures create incentives to 
elicit provider-level responses driving positive outcomes for the organization.  The interaction of 
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these incentives and responses is key in realizing positive health and economic outcomes for 
patients, providers and healthcare systems.   
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